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DRAFT: August 13, 2013

Introduction
In one of its most-watched recent cases, the United States Supreme Court struck down a
class action alleging that Wal-Mart stores discriminated against female employees in pay and
promotion decisions. 1 The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart’s corporate culture and highly
discretionary decision-making practices led to sex discrimination on a company-wide basis, and
they sought injunctive relief as well as backpay for individual employees. Reversing the Court
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, the Supreme Court held in Wal-Mart v. Dukes that the proposed
class—which it estimated at one-and-a-half million plaintiffs—failed to meet the requirements
for class action certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Although
the decision was widely understood as raising the bar for all types of class actions, it had
particular significance for employment discrimination litigation. Observers wondered if it
signaled the end of large-scale employment litigation aimed at structural reform of the
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1

Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).

2

More specifically, a majority of the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2)
requirement of showing that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class” because they had not
identified a companywide discriminatory policy. Id. at 2556. The four dissenters would have upheld the district
court’s determination that the proposed class met the commonality requirement, finding a common dispute as to
whether Wal-Mart’s discretion pay and promotion policies produced discriminatory outcomes. Id. at 2566
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). All nine justices unanimously agreed that because the plaintiffs sought individual
monetary relief in addition to class-wide injunctive relief, the class should be not have been certified under Rule
23(b)(2); cases in which the monetary relief is not incidental to in junctive or declaratory relief should proceed as
23(b)(3) class actions, if at all.
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workplace, or an implicit rejection of more expansive theories of employer liability under Title
VII. 3
While class litigation has continued in the wake of Wal-Mart, the opinion is clearly
making it more difficult to obtain certification of private employment discrimination class
actions. 4 As a result, the role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in
seeking structural reform of the workplace has gained in comparative importance. Unlike private
litigants, the EEOC need not comply with the requirements of Rule 23 when it seeks relief on
behalf of a group of aggrieved individuals. 5 Instead, the EEOC possesses express statutory
authority to sue in its own name to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment
discrimination and to seek relief for a group of employees. 6 Because the Commission need not
meet the formal requirements for class certification, observers anticipate that the agency will
play a larger role in bringing systemic cases in the future. 7 And the EEOC has recently
recommitted to strengthening its focus on such cases. 8
Given the EEOC’s unique role in Title VII’s remedial scheme, the agency’s past
experience with systemic cases and its efforts to seek structural reform of workplaces warrant
close study. Even before the Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart, the role and effectiveness of
large-scale litigation in combating discrimination in the workplace was highly contested. Two
dominant theories offer different accounts of injunctive practices aimed at structural reform of
the workplace, alternatively emphasizing dramatic struggles or intense collaborations to
transform the culture and practices of the targeted organization. In this Article, we undertake a
systematic analysis of the EEOC’s injunctive practices over a ten-year period of time and
measure them against the extant theories. We find a notable disconnect. We observe instead that
the injunctive relief obtained by the EEOC in these cases appears primarily aimed at forcing
3

See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
395 (2011); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477 (2011); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. WalMart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34 (2011); Sherry E. Clegg, Employment Discrimination Class Actions: Why
Plaintiffs Must Cover All Their Bases After the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a)(2) in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1087 (2012); John M Husband & Bradford J. Williams, WalMart v. Dukes Redux: The Future of the Sprawling Class Action, 40 COLO. LAW. 43 (2011).
4

Although a number of proposed class actions have failed to be certified following Wal-Mart, see e.g., Davis v.
Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2013) (denying certification of proposed nationwide sex discrimination class
action); Stockwell v. City of San Francisco, 2011 WL 4803505 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying class certification); Bell
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2011 WL 6256978 (D.N.J. 2011) (denying class certification), in other cases, courts have
granted certification where the facts were distinguishable from Wal-Mart. See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco, 285 F.R.D. 492
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (certifying class action); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482
(7th Cir. 2012) (certifying class action race discrimination case); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co, 877 F.
Supp.2d 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class certification).
5

General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980).

6

Id. at 331.

7

See, e.g., Lydell C. Bridgeford, EEOC’s Systemic Program Set to Fill Gap in Private Class Actions, Attorneys
Predict, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 244, Dec. 19, 2012, at A-5.
8

See EEOC, EEOC STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2016, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/strategic_plan_12to16.pdf; Leslie E. Silverman et al., EEOC, SYSTEMIC
TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE CHAIR OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (March 2006),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/upload/systemic.pdf [hereinafter EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT].
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firms to implement what are commonly accepted as good and rational human resources practices.
As we explore, these forms of injunctive relief are consonant with the sociological literature
about how firms respond in non-litigation contexts to antidiscrimination law.
The phenomenon of “public law litigation” was first recognized and described in the
period immediately following the passage of Title VII. 9 Employment discrimination litigation
was viewed as one slice of the more general category of structural reform litigation, in which
plaintiffs used injunctions to transform important American institutions, forcing them to align
their practices with public norms. Although many of the examples cited involved suits against
public entities such as hospitals, prisons, jails and schools, a number of scholars concurred that
employment discrimination cases fit the public law litigation model. 10 Scholars like Owen Fiss
and Abram Chayes, along with a crowd of other observers, 11 depicted mammoth cases that
provide the occasion for heroic (or imperial 12) judging or advocacy. The literature describes
cases that last for years, even decades, and cost millions of dollars to litigate, that pose acute
challenges to the managerial capacity of courts and offer occasions for power grabs by plaintiffs.
Both those who praise and those who condemn structural reform litigation have concurred in this
general description, which we call the gladiator theory of structural reform litigation.
While this depiction of structural reform litigation as protracted struggle persists in the
literature, another vision has developed alongside it. Charles Sabel and William Simon wrote in
2004 that the litigation has moved away from remedial intervention modeled on command-andcontrol bureaucracy “toward a kind of intervention that can be called ‘experimentalist,’” which
“emphasizes ongoing stakeholder negotiation, continuously revised performance measures, and
transparency.” 13 Others have taken similar approaches focusing more particularly on
employment discrimination litigation, arguing for what they term a “structural approach” to
solving problems of “second generation discrimination” in employment. 14 In their view, the
“easy” first generation cases of blatant discrimination are largely gone; discriminatory bias in
9

Owen Fiss, Foreword, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice];
see also OWEN FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) [hereinafter FISS, CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION]; Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Public
Law Litigation].
10

See, e.g., Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 9, at 1284 (listing employment discrimination cases as
one of the “avatars” of public law litigation); Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private
Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 919 (1978) (asserting that Title VII
class actions have the characteristics of public law litigation); Maimon Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private
Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L. J. 887, 893
(1984) [hereinafter Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain] (asserting that Title VII litigation is a
“formidable example” of “public law”).
11

For an extensive guide to the literature, see Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case
Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 569-570 n. 71 (2006); Margo Schlanger, Beyond the
Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1995-1997 & nn. 10-15 (1999).
12

See Nathan Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PUB. INT. 104 (1975).

13

Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) [hereinafter Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights].
14

See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 458 (2001); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003).
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employment today is more subtle and difficult to detect, yet the structure of the contemporary
workplace renders it nonetheless extremely potent. Effective workplace reform efforts require
not battles, but collaborations. They point to some high profile cases as embodying this
approach—relying on flexible, context-specific remedies to create “processes of accountability”
and encourage experimentation and information-sharing. We refer to this model of civil rights
injunctive litigation as the collaboration theory.
Both the gladiator and collaboration depictions of employment discrimination litigation
incorporate descriptive claims—that the proffered picture of employment discrimination
litigation portrays some significant portion of the real world docket. However, these theories
tend to rest on a handful of mega cases that are not necessarily representative. 15 In the 1970s, a
prime example was the litigation against AT&T. 16 More recently, analysis has featured suits
against Shoney’s, 17 Home Depot, 18 Wal-Mart, 19 Coca-Cola, 20 and Texaco. 21 Observers disagree
on how to interpret these high-profile cases, 22 but perhaps the greater problem lies in taking them
as representative of broader trends. These cases constitute just a sliver of a larger docket of cases
aimed at providing relief to a group or class of employees—cases that have gone largely
unexamined. In this Article, we begin to fill that gap by systematically examining one important
category of those cases, rather than just a salient few. Specifically, we analyze the litigation
activities and injunctive relief obtained by the EEOC in cases brought over a ten-year period
15

Similarly, in discussing prison and jail injunctive litigation, one of us has written that “our knowledge about a
few cases is deep but highly unreliable more generally because those few are so aberrational.” Margo Schlanger,
Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 569
(2006).
16

See, e.g., EEOC v. AT&T, 365 F.Supp. 1105 (E.D. Penn. 1973) (No. 73-149, filed Jan. 18, 1973); for
documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11146; MARJORIE STOCKFORD, THE
BELLWOMEN: THE STORY OF THE LANDMARK AT&T SEX DISCRIMINATION CASE (2004); HERBERT R. NORTHRUP &
JOHN A. LARSON , THE IMPACT OF THE AT&T-EEO CONSENT DECREE (1979).
17

Haynes v. Shoney’s, 1993 WL 19915 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (No. 3:89-cv-30093, filed Apr. 4, 1989); for
documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10711; see Nancy Levit, Megacases,
Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367 (2008) [hereinafter Levit, Megacases].
18

Butler v. Home Depot, No. 3:94-cv-04335 (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 19, 1994); for documents and information,
see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9471; see Sturm, supra note 14; Levit, Megacases, supra note 17;
Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and
Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003).
19

Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 3:01-cv-02252 N.D. Cal., filed June 8, 2001); for documents
and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10697; LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WORKING
WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORKERS’ RIGHTS AT WAL-MART (2004).
20

Ingram v. Coca-Cola, 200 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 1:98-cv-03679, filed Dec. 12, 1998); for
documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9473; see also, e.g., Levit, Megacases,
supra note 17; Henry Unger, Discrimination Lawsuit-Coca-Cola Accused of “Company-wide Pattern,” ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Apr. 24, 1999, at H1.
21

Roberts v. Texaco, 979 F.Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (No. 7:94-cv-02015, filed Mar. 23, 1994); for
documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8162; see Selmi, supra note 18; Cathy
Cronin-Harris & David M. White, Negotiating Enduring Corporate Change: A Case Study on the Task Force on
Equality
and
Fairness
in
Roberts
v.
Texaco
Inc.,
available
at
http://www.dmwlawfirm.com/resources/Texaco%20Case%20Study.pdf; Levit, Megacases, supra note 17.
22

Selmi and Sturm disagree, for example, on nearly everything important about the Home Depot case. Compare
Selmi, supra note 18; Sturm, supra note 14.
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from fiscal years 1997-2006 inclusive, 23 focusing on the most “class-like” cases—those most
likely aiming at structural reform of the workplace.
Our analysis necessarily leaves out of view the many class actions brought by private
counsel. 24 While these cases are certainly important for a comprehensive understanding of
structural reform litigation in the employment context, the EEOC is a particularly significant
player—one with an increasingly important role following the Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart
decision. The EEOC’s reports have stressed its “unique role and responsibility in combating
systemic discrimination” and emphasized the importance of these cases to its mission.25 Not
only can it seek broad remedial provisions without certifying a class, the agency’s public funding
allows it to pursue cases in which monetary damages are low or difficult to prove, and its history,
regulatory role and nationwide reach give it resources unavailable to private counsel. Because of
its special role in enforcement, the agency’s activities represent a crucial component of structural
reform efforts in the workplace and warrant close study. During the period of our study, the
EEOC brought many cases involving systemic discrimination and after systematically examining
these, we find that neither the gladiator nor the collaboration theory of large-scale employment
discrimination litigation comfortably fits the reality of the EEOC’s litigation practice.
Considering first the gladiator model, few of its predicted features are prevalent in the
cases we examined. Even in the most class-like cases, the EEOC’s litigation is fairly modest; the
cases are not bet-the-company battles and the awards are for thousands or occasionally millions
of dollars, but not tens or hundreds of millions. The remedial phases last several years, not
decades, and the dockets show few signs of post-decretal struggle. The cases are, it seems, only
occasionally highly contentious; few epic battles appear. Most often no heated contestation of
antidiscrimination norms takes place; the cases nearly always end with settlements rather than
litigated judgments, and most of those settlements are negotiated without significant judicial
intervention. Nor do the decrees require wholesale change to company practices, but rather more
modest changes—in particular, the rationalization of hiring, promotion and complaint
investigation processes. In short, these are ordinary, moderate-size litigations, not dramatic
struggles.
At the same time, there is little sign of the type of flexible, contextualized, and
decentralized problem-solving processes that the collaboration theorists envision. The EEOC’s
decrees are not obviously individualized or contextual; most of their terms recur across cases.
Moreover, only rarely do the decrees appear to require actions that are significantly integrated
with an employer’s core operations. It is, of course, possible that the terms of these consent
23

For the EEOC, as for the federal government as a whole, a fiscal year begins on October 1 of the previous
year and runs through September 30 of the year which it is numbered.
24

Employment discrimination suits were and remain one of the largest components of federal court civil
litigation, see ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS:
MARCH
31,
2006,
2006
TBL.
C-2A
(2006),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2006/appendices/c2a.pdf; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2012, 2012 TBL. C-2A (2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C02ASep12.pdf; the vast majority of
employment discrimination suits are brought by private counsel.
25

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION‘S SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT (2006),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/systemic.cfm.
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decrees do not capture the collaborative nature of the problem-solving they frame. By definition,
a collaborative approach to structural reform will not entail clearly articulated rules or goals.
Rather, one might look for evidence that a decree sets up a process that encourages and
facilitates creative, accountable and effective problem-solving. Our data, however, contain little
such evidence. The EEOC’s consent decrees generally repeat the same handful of requirements
regarding matters like notice-posting, training, and complaint-processing. While a significant
minority of the decrees empower specified actors—human resources managers or consultants—
to report to management and oversee implementation, very few decrees appear to put into place
any mechanisms to create benchmarks by which employers might be held accountable or to
encourage ongoing dialogue and norm creation with interested stakeholders. And virtually none
of the consent decrees we examined appear to give ordinary employees any meaningful voice in
the process of articulating and implementing anti-discrimination norms apart from the ability to
file individual complaints.
If the gladiator and collaboration models do not accurately capture the reality of the
EEOC’s injunctive litigation, how best can it be understood? Even in those cases we identify as
systemic, the remedies obtained by the EEOC are geared more towards rationalizing the firm’s
employment practices than transforming its culture and norms. They impose practices that
would be entirely familiar to firms with well-functioning human resources departments that have
adopted professionally endorsed “best practices” for compliance with the law. Thus we argue
that the agency’s structural reform efforts are best viewed not as intense battles seeking to
transform the heart and soul of complex organizations, nor as equally intense and equally
transformative partnerships, but as the quite routinized application of managerialist, bureaucratic
responses to the legal prohibitions against discrimination.
In reaching this interpretation, we draw on scholarly work that focuses not on injunctive
remedies in structural reform cases, but on organizations’ responses to the general litigation
threat posed by Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes. Lauren Edelman, Frank Dobbin,
and many others have argued that the requirements of anti-discrimination laws induce employers
to respond in ways that signal compliance with the law while mediating tensions with the
organization’s managerial interests. Managers came to embrace the advice of personnel
professionals who have long advocated a set of standardized bureaucratic responses, such as
creating anti-discrimination policies, conducting EEO trainings, and establishing grievance
procedures. These responses diffused through professional networks and were eventually
validated by court decisions endorsing them as liability-defeating compliance. Our close
examination of the EEOC’s litigation efforts indicate that the injunctive remedies it obtained
during the period of our study largely mirror these types of managerialist responses.
This Article is organized as follows: In Part I, we survey the literature on structural
reform litigation and on the organizational responses to anti-discrimination law. In Part II, we
describe the EEOC’s role as a structural reform plaintiff. Part III presents three case studies as
examples of the EEOC’s systemic litigation, detailing the types of injunctive relief obtained.
Part IV more systematically explores the injunctive relief obtained in the EEOC’s systemic
litigation over a ten-year period. It describes our methodology, sets out some basic information
about the agency’s systemic docket, and then examines how the docket as a whole lines up with
the competing theories. It also offers our interpretation of the EEOC’s injunctive practice as
consistent with standard, bureaucratic personnel practices, suggesting that the agency has played
a role in promoting and ratifying the managerialist responses adopted by many organizations.
-6https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/89
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Part V concludes by assessing the EEOC’s efforts to address systemic discrimination. (All data
and replication code are posted online 26; the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse 27 archives
relevant case documents and other information.)
I.

Prior literature

Large-scale employment suits have often been cited as one example of what Owen Fiss
named “structural reform” litigation—cases that try “to give meaning to [legal] values in the
operation of large-scale organizations.” 28 As Fiss explained, “[s]tructural reform is premised on
the notion that the quality of our social life is affected in important ways by the operation of
large-scale organizations, not just by individuals acting either beyond or within these
organizations.” 29 Abram Chayes labeled the same type of cases as “public law litigation.” 30 In
the early 1970s when this literature began, the EEOC and Department of Justice brought
numerous high profile class actions against public and private employers; 31 private litigants
likewise filed many large and important employment cases. 32 The large-scale employment
discrimination case was thus highly salient at the time, and viewed as an important species of
structural reform litigation. Chayes, for example, declared that employment discrimination
cases, along with school desegregation and prisoners’ rights cases “come readily to mind as
avatars of this new form of litigation.” 33 And Maimon Schwarzchild labeled Title VII litigation
a “formidable example” of ‘public law’ or ‘structural’ litigation. 34 Focusing on the employment
context, we review in this section existing theories of structural reform and how the law and
litigation shapes organizational responses to anti-discrimination mandates.
A. The gladiator theory
Prior work has magnified the image of structural reform litigation, giving the impression
that civil rights injunctive cases are nearly invariably the sites of long- and hard-fought struggles
for justice. In Against Settlement, in 1984, Fiss wrote:
26

See http://margoschlanger.net and http://eeoclitigation.wustl.edu/. [these aren’t posted yet]

27

See http://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=1.

28

Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 9, see also FISS, CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 9.

29

Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 9, at 2.

30

Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 9.

31

See FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY at 220 (2009) [hereinafter DOBBIN, INVENTING EO].
For a discussion of numerous suits brought by the EEOC and the Department of Justice in the 1970s, see
Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain, supra note 10.
32

See, e.g., Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68 (D.D.C. 1981); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 491 F.Supp. 232
(D.R.I. 1980), aff'd, 685 F.2d 743 (1st Cir. 1982). In a study of the Northern District of California’s cases that were
closed between 1979 and 1984, employment discrimination cases comprised 21 of 46 certified class actions (and 24
of 73 putative class actions terminated without certification). Garth, Nagel, & Plager, The Institution of the Private
Attorney General, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 355-56 & nn.5-6 (1988).
33

Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 9, at 1284.

34

Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain, supra note 10, at 888.

-7Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

7

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 89 [2013]

The structural reform cases that play such a prominent role on the federal docket
provide another occasion for continuing judicial involvement. In these cases,
courts seek to safeguard public values by restructuring large-scale bureaucratic
organizations. The task is enormous, and our knowledge of how to restructure ongoing bureaucratic organizations is limited. As a consequence, courts must
oversee and manage the remedial process for a long time—maybe forever. 35
These are cases, Fiss says, in which ongoing disputes and judicial involvement are “inevitable,”
even in cases that settle:
The parties may be ignorant of the difficulties ahead or optimistic about the future, or
they may simply believe that they can get more favorable terms through a bargained-for
agreement. Soon, however, the inevitable happens: One party returns to court and asks
the judge to modify the decree, either to make it more effective or less stringent.36

From this perspective, a key feature of structural reform cases is their dramatic quality.
These are, for Fiss, cases replete with “confrontations” and “threats,” and therefore particularly
in need of stalwart judging:
The judge tries to give meaning to our constitutional values in the operation of
these organizations. . . The structural suit is one in which a judge, confronting a
state bureaucracy over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to
restructure the organization to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the
present institutional arrangements. The injunction is the means by which these
reconstructive directives are transmitted. 37
Likewise, Colin Diver explained in the context of custodial institution litigation that decree
development and enforcement are complex and contentious processes:
The decree usually has followed an extended process that began with a court
order to the defendants to submit a comprehensive plan for the eradication of
violations and continued through lengthy negotiations and revisions.
Promulgation of the decree has not terminated the litigation but instead simply has
initiated a process of enforcement extending into the indefinite future. Ordinarily,
the court has appointed an individual or a committee to monitor the defendants'
compliance and to recommend corrective measures, but often it must reenter the
dispute repeatedly to interpret or to modify the original order or to invoke its
coercive powers to secure compliance. 38
This observation of intense judicial involvement—whether as adjudicator, manager, or
enforcer—is the dominant takeaway of much of the structural reform literature. Whatever their
35

Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083 (1984).

36

Id.

37

Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 9.

38

Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions,
65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979).
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precise role, judges’ “time-consuming and cumbersome supervision” is said to be characteristic
of structural reform litigation. 39
Even observers less focused on the role of the judge agree that these cases are likely to be
extremely drawn out and contentious, characterized by endless squabbles over implementation.
John Jeffries and George Rutherglen, for example, highlight the importance of consent decrees
rather than litigation in structural reform cases, but their description nonetheless emphasizes the
conflict in the proceedings, which, they observe, “came to resemble a form of supervised
political bargaining.” 40 And Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod criticize public law litigation
for the authority it offers plaintiffs’ lawyers in countless rounds of post-liability negotiations. 41
Discussion of public law litigation sometimes focused on the public status of the
defendants—but otherwise, employment discrimination cases were considered part and parcel of
the phenomenon of structural reform litigation. Cases brought by employees against private
employers were classified as “public” based on their broad impact. To quote Schwarzchild:
The outcome of a Title VII case may be to restructure an employer's entire process of
selecting, hiring, training, assigning, promoting, and firing staff. Such a remedy affects not
only the parties—the plaintiffs and the employer—but also the incumbent employees, future
applicants, and the economic and moral interests of society as a whole. 42
B. The collaboration theory
Over the past decade, a number of scholars have articulated a new vision of institutional
reform litigation, representing a distinct break from traditional models of public law litigation.
For example, Charles Sabel and William Simon argue that “[t]he evolution of structural remedies
in recent decades can be usefully stylized as a shift away from command-and-control injunctive
regulation toward experimentalist intervention.” 43 Building on a developing set of “democratic
experimentalist” ideas about regulation 44 they explain:
[E]xperimentalist regulation combines more flexible and provisional norms with
procedures for ongoing stakeholder participation and measured accountability. . . .
[T]he governing norms are general standards that express the goals the parties are
expected to achieve—that is, outputs rather than inputs. Typically, the regime
leaves the parties with a substantial range of discretion as to how to achieve these
39

Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. REV. 85 (2007).

40

John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1387 (2007).

41

For an example of a litigant-focused analysis that makes these points, see, e.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID
SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003); Ross Sandler
& David Schoenbrod, From Status to Contract and Back Again: Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation,
27 REV. OF LITIGATION 115 (2007).
42

Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain, supra note 10, at 893.

43

Simon & Sabel, Destabilization Rights, supra note 13,. at 1019.

44

See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to
Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002).
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goals. At the same time, it specifies both standards and procedures for the
measurement of the institution's performance. 45
This vision of public law litigation is less conflict-suffused than the gladiator literature
cited above. The law still plays a key role—the assertion of rights can destabilize the established
practices of public institutions. However, rather than relying on top-down, fixed-rule solutions
imposed by a court, that destabilization can “open up” an organization to an on-going process of
deliberation among parties and stakeholders in order to resolve problems organically. Because
experimentalist remedies “contemplate a permanent process of ramifying, participatory selfrevision rather than a one-time readjustment to fixed criteria,” 46 significant post-decretal
engagement by the parties, under the supervision of the court, is contemplated. On the other
hand, courts are less involved in the shaping of specific remedies than under the traditional
vision: “the norms that define compliance at any one moment are the work not of the judiciary,
but of the actors who live by them.” 47
Building on this vision, some employment law scholars have argued for a structural
response to employment discrimination. They argue that the nature of discriminatory bias in the
workplace has changed in form. Early litigation efforts focused on eliminating overt forms of
race and gender subordination in the workplace. Today, although “whites only” employment
listings and explicit race or gender classifications have largely disappeared, significant disparities
in employment outcomes persist along race and gender lines, the result of more subtle forms of
bias that block the progress of racial minorities and women in the workplace.
Sometimes called “second generation discrimination,” these more subtle and complex
types of bias are the product of workplace structures, rather than “deliberate exclusion or
subordination based on race or gender.” 48 Some scholars attribute second generation
discrimination to psychological processes, such as unconscious racism or implicit cognitive
bias. 49 Others emphasize the significance of informal interactions within a firm’s organizational
structure. Susan Sturm, for example, argues that “[s]econd generation claims frequently involve
patterns of interaction among groups within the workplace that, over time, exclude nondominant
groups.” 50 These interactions may include a variety of behaviors such as undermining or
“freezing out” by colleagues, or exclusion from important training and mentoring opportunities.
Viewed in isolation, these interactions are not easily identified as discriminatory, but the broader
pattern of interaction can result in excluding or blocking the progress of members of disfavored
groups. Tristin Green similarly argues that the shift to more subtle forms of discriminatory bias
is linked to the structure of the workplace. In particular, developments such as the breakdown of
45

Simon & Sabel, Destabilization Rights, supra note 13, at 1019.

46

Id. at 1019.

47

Id.

48

Sturm, supra note 14, at 466-68.

49

See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Ann C. McGinley,
!Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 415 (2000).
50

Sturm, supra note 14, at 468.
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internal labor markets, the replacement of fixed job ladders with “flattened hierarchies,” the
emphasis on flexibility and the growth of peer assessments diffuse responsibility for decisionmaking, making it more difficult to identify discrete discriminatory acts. 51 Importantly, this
form of discrimination results not from a discrete, individual action, but from “ongoing patterns
of interaction shaped by organizational culture.” 52
Citing these changes in the nature of discrimination and the organization of work, a
number of scholars have argued that anti-discrimination law must change as well. Some have
argued for amending Title VII’s liability standards. 53 Others have focused specifically on
remedial issues—that is, what types of regulation can effectively combat second-generation
forms of discrimination? To the extent that bias results from organizational structure, any
effective remedy must be “structural” as well. Thus, Green argues for “a theory of structural
disparate treatment” that “would generate the type of contextualized, multifaceted problemsolving process needed for change.” 54 Similarly, Sturm calls for a “de-centered, holistic, and
dynamic approach to these more structural forms of bias,” 55 one that would encourage “the
evolution of accountable and legitimate internal problem-solving processes.” 56 Like the
experimentalist regulation literature of which it is a part, this approach encourages “the
development of institutions and processes to enact general norms in particular contexts” and
“experimentation with respect to information gathering, organizational design, incentive
structures, measures of effectiveness, and methods of institutionalizing accountability.” 57
Similarly observing a shift away from traditional command and control regulation,
Cynthia Estlund sees the “potential to create new mechanisms for the enforcement of employee
rights and labor standards.” 58 Although her focus is on basic labor standards, such as minimum
wage and overtime requirements and health and safety regulations, Estlund’s analysis
encompasses the trend toward self-regulation in the enforcement of anti-discrimination norms as
well. In her view, effective self-regulation must be “‘tripartite’ in structure”—that is, “[i]t
requires the participation of the government, the regulated firm, and the workers for whose
benefits the relevant legal norms exist.” Establishing meaningful tripartism has been made more
difficult, however, by the steep decline in unionization rates. 59 Thus, she argues that a crucial
element of any effective regime of self-regulation is “[i]ndependent outside monitoring with

51

Green, supra note 14, at 99-104. See also Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
52

Sturm, supra note 14, at 468.

53

See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some
Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993).
54

Green, supra note 14, at 156.

55

Sturm, supra note 14, at 462.

56

Id. at 491.

57

Id. at 463.

58

Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319
(2005).
59

Id. at 323.
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direct input from employees.” 60 Employee participation is essential to the success of selfregulation because employee representatives can not only help devise and implement flexible,
relevant substantive changes in the workplace, they are also in the best position to monitor firm
compliance. 61
This recent work on experimentalist forms of regulation has both normative and
descriptive components. It advocates that courts and parties pursue structural solutions, but also
asserts that the elements of such an approach are emerging in actual practice. Thus, Green points
to the terms of several recent settlement agreements and consent decrees as exemplars of efforts
that address structural concerns. 62 Similarly, Sturm explores three cases studies as concrete
examples of new types of collaborative efforts to identify and address manifestations of
workplace bias. 63
C. The Managerialism Theory
A third strain of scholarship about anti-discrimination law is highly relevant here as well,
although it does not highlight injunctive practice. In research spanning decades, sociologists
Lauren Edelman, Frank Dobbin, and others have documented the ways in which the legal ideals
of civil rights laws are constructed and reconstructed as those prescriptions move from the legal
domain into organizations. Confronted with a legal mandate forbidding discrimination, firms
have long sought to develop responses that signaled “a visible commitment to the law” 64 At the
same time, firms have viewed antidiscrimination mandates as potentially in conflict with
managerial interests in exercising broad discretion and operating efficiently. When a law like
Title VII is “ambiguous, procedural in emphasis, and difficult to enforce,” it is “especially open
to organizational mediation.” 65 In other words, ambiguity leaves firms greater leeway to
“construct the law in a manner that is minimally disruptive to the status quo,” 66 and as they
internalize the law, it becomes “infused with managerial values.” 67
The process unfolded over time, with personnel professionals gaining influence in
defining compliance and courts ratifying those responses. Dobbin writes that “it was civil rights
activists who fought for equal opportunity in employment . . . [b]ut it was personnel managers
who defined what job discrimination was and was not. . . . In the absence of clear government
guidelines, personnel experts modeled compliance measures on classical personnel practices.” 68
60

Id. at 356.

61

Id. at 358.

62

Green, supra note 14, at 155.

63

Sturm, supra note 14, at 491.
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Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law,
97 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 1531, 1542 (1992) [hereinafter Edelman, Legal Ambiguity].
65

Id. at 1542.
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Id. at 1535.
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Lauren B. Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller, & Iona Mara-Drita. Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of
Law, 106 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 1589, 1592 (2001) [hereinafter Edelman, et al., Diversity Rhetoric].
68

DOBBIN, INVENTING EO, supra note 31, at 220.
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As these measures spread among firms, courts in turn begin to defer, taking these common
organizational practices as evidence of good faith compliance and thereby ratifying the
rationality of these responses. For example, the notion that firms should institute internal EEO
grievance procedures to reduce their risks of liability is now widely accepted. Edelman, Uggen,
and Erlanger recount, however, that this “accepted wisdom” emerged at a time when there was
little empirical evidence that internal grievance procedures either reduced the incidence of
external claims or would be accepted as a legal defense in court. 69 Nevertheless, accounts of the
value of grievance procedures were “told and retold” 70 so that such procedures came to be
equated with rational practices, and firms seeking to demonstrate compliance with the legal
mandate adopted these procedures. Eventually the Supreme Court joined the chorus,
authoritatively, when it held that employers that had grievance procedures could assert an
affirmative defense against claims of hostile work environment sexual harassment under some
circumstances. 71 By endorsing existing practices, the Court transformed grievance systems into
a rational liability-reduction response.
In a similar manner, other organizational responses to the anti-discrimination mandate
have become part of a standard bureaucratic set of responses to the legal prohibitions against
employment discrimination. In additional to grievance procedures, firms typically adopt explicit
anti-discrimination policies and often require “sensitivity training” of managers or employees;
they also include equal employment opportunity affirmations in their job advertising, or adopt
other kinds of diversity programs. 72 Many scholars are extremely skeptical about the efficacy of
these measures, dismissing much of the modern diversity toolkit as mere window dressing that
signals EEO compliance while doing little to promote equality or unbiased decision-making in
the workplace. But whether they work or not, these sorts of managerialist responses are now
prevalent. 73

69

Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen, & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation:
Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 406, 409 (1999)
70

Id.at 408.

71

See Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998).
72

See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Erin L. Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction of Legal
Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1203 (2007) [hereinafter Dobbin & Kelly, How to Stop
Harassment]; Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin, & Erin Kelly, Best Practices or Best Guesses? Diversity
Management and the Remediation of Inequality, 71 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 589 (2006) [hereinafter Kalev,
Dobbin, & Kelly, Best Practices].
73

See, e.g., Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, Best Practices, supra note 72; Frank Dobbin, Soohan Kim & Alexandra
Kalev, You Can’t Always Get What You Need: Why Diverse Firms Adopt Diversity Programs, 76 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 386 (2011); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law
22 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4-6, 27-28 (2001) [hereinafter Bisom-Rapp, Ounce of Prevention]; Susan BisomRapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: the Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training
by the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147 (2001); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free:
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671 (2000); Anne Lawton, Operating in an
Empirical Vacuum: the Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197 (2004); Edelman,
Endogeneity; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV.
1, 29 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Structural Turn].
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The sociological literature on managerialist responses to antidiscrimination laws and
norms focuses on how firms generally interpret and adapt to the law, however, not on their
response to targeted litigation and specific types of injunctions. In contrast, the traditional
literature on structural reform highlights the impact of litigated reform efforts, suggesting that
injunctive orders provoke different responses than the mere liability-creating statute and the
resulting litigation threat. Selmi’s work bridges the gap between these two strands. He argues
that while earlier public law litigation imposed meaningful remedies like redesigned employment
tests or preferential hiring for discrimination victims, 74 in more recent class actions, private
litigants have been content with remedies like EEO training and diversity initiatives—the types
of responses documented in the managerialism literature.
Selmi is highly critical of the shift: “Not so long ago, class action employment
discrimination suits were defined as a quintessential form of public law litigation where
monetary relief was generally viewed as one component of necessary remedial relief, and a far
less important component than the institutional reform the suit ultimately produced.” 75 By
contrast, he argues that today “employment discrimination litigation has become a private affair
that is largely about money and public relations, and rarely concerned with implementing broad
institutional reform.” 76 Even when a prospective consent decree is entered, courts have little
involvement in shaping the terms of those decrees; instead, they are negotiated between private
parties who agree to actions—training programs or diversity initiatives, for example—that are
predictably ineffective in combating discrimination and serve the corporation’s interests, rather
than fundamentally altering its crucial personnel practices. 77 Although he does not use the same
terminology, Selmi is essentially complaining that the private EEO class action has embraced
managerialist responses, rather than more reformist remedies, abandoning meaningful measures
to benefit victims and prevent future discrimination.
Selmi’s argument rests in part on the changed incentives for the private bar following
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which increased the availability of money damages. His
focus is therefore on the private class action, and he does not claim that his tort model describes
the EEOC’s litigation practice. Indeed, Selmi has acknowledged differences between private
lawyers and the EEOC. 78 One might expect that the EEOC, as a publicly funded agency, is less
likely to be driven by monetary concerns. In fact, the agency has self-consciously adopted a
stance differentiating itself from private litigants, claiming to target systemic discrimination for
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Selmi, supra note 18, at 1298-99.
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Id. at 1251-52.

76

Id. at 1331.
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Id. at 1297.
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Selmi does not assess how the EEOC fits into his model, but he suggests that government-initiated litigation
in the past looked different from today’s large private class action. At the same time, he criticizes the agency’s
recent efforts in large class action suits as “almost comically inept.” Id. at 1331. Selmi also suggests that EEOC
involvement in private class actions—for example, as a monitor of consent decrees—might help to restore the public
interest focus of these cases. Id. at 1330. See also Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the
Agency’s Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1996) [hereinafter Selmi, Value of the
EEOC] (arguing that the EEOC “ought to provide some value that is different from what could be provided by
private attorneys since there are obvious costs to having a public agency process claims”).
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reform and to assist complainants based on the merits, not the monetary value, of their claims. 79
Nevertheless, Selmi’s analysis raises questions about the EEOC’s injunctive practices. If, as we
find, the EEOC pursues the same kinds of limited injunctive remedies that he criticizes, that casts
some doubt on his theory that prioritization of monetary relief over structural reform explains
the predominance of such remedies.
***
The literature thus offers three accounts of structural reform of the workplace in response
to civil rights laws. The gladiator theory focuses on large-scale cases, depicting litigation as
battle and the injunctions obtained as intrusively transformational of recalcitrant institutions.
The collaboration theory emphasizes litigation-driven experimentation, information-sharing and
accountability as the pathways to meaningfully reforming biased decision-making processes.
And what we will call managerialism theory highlights organizations’ voluntary responses to the
legal prohibition against discrimination by adopting a standard set of bureaucratic responses,
such as EEO policies, training programs, and grievance procedures. Our purpose here is not to
resolve debates over which approach would be most effective in combating employment
discrimination. Rather, our aim is to examine the activities of one particularly important
player—the EEOC—to understand more about how it pursues structural reform through its
litigation activities.
II.

The EEOC as a Structural Reform Plaintiff

The EEOC plays a unique role in the scheme established by Congress for enforcement of
Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes. Employees who believe they have been
discriminated against must first file a charge against their employer with the EEOC. 80 The
Commission processes tens of thousands of charges annually, investigating and making
determinations whether or not there is cause to believe that discrimination occurred. 81 At any
time after 180 days from the filing of the charge, complaining employees are entitled to a “right
to sue” letter, which authorizes them to seek redress against the employer in federal district
court. 82 Numerous charges exit the administrative process in this way, often before the EEOC
has completed investigation, and in the period here examined private plaintiffs filed fourteen to

79

See, e.g., EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.

80

Litigants are required to first exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC when alleging
discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or pregnancy, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); age, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; and disability, the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. In addition, the EEOC was recently given the responsibility of receiving claims of
genetic discrimination under Title II of the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11. Alternatively, employees may file charges with state fair employment agencies where they
exist. For simplicity, we refer here only to the EEOC’s role.
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twenty-five thousand employment discrimination cases each year in federal district courts. 83 In
cases in which the EEOC proceeds to a “cause” finding, the agency tries to “conciliate” or settle
the charge with the employer. If no agreement is reached, the EEOC may choose to file a lawsuit
on behalf of the charging party. 84 The charging party has the right to retain her own lawyer and
intervene in the EEOC’s lawsuit. 85
During the period of this study, the EEOC filed a few hundred cases each year in federal
court. 86 Many of those cases sought modest compensation for just one or a handful of people.
Although the resolution of those cases often included simple injunctive measures, such as
banning discrimination and posting an antidiscrimination policy, they essentially addressed
individual grievances. In other cases, the EEOC’s cases aimed to have a broader effect. In
carrying out its mission of “promot[ing] equality of opportunity in the workplace,” 87 the
Commission has—to varying degrees over time—emphasized its commitment to opposing
“systemic discrimination.” 88 A 2006 Task Force Report highlighted the Commission’s “unique
role and responsibility in combating systemic discrimination,” defining its “systemic” cases as:
“pattern or practice, policy and/or class cases where the alleged discrimination has a broad
impact on an industry, profession, company, or geographic location.” 89 For much of its history
the EEOC has seemed to consider its systemic cases the most important component of the
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See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, tbl. C-2A,
annually, for years 1997-2006, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/archive.aspx.
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Section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Although the agency was
initially only empowered to seek conciliation when it found a claim to be meritorious, see Selmi, Value of the
EEOC, supra note 78, at 5; Belton, supra note 10. Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to, among other things, give
the EEOC the power to sue in federal court to vindicate the rights of complaining employees.
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On occasion, a charging party obtains a right to sue letter and file suit in federal court first. The EEOC may
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That level of new litigation filings has decreased in recent years; in the first Obama administration, filings
were in the 200-300 range, and in 2012, down to 122. See EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, FY 1997 THROUGH FY
2012, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm; U.S. EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND
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discriminators first.” Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action, Part I:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House of Rep. Comm. on Education and Labor,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1981) (statement of J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting EEOC Chair). These criteria related to low
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women or minorities. See EEOC COMPL. MAN., ¶ 562; Richard I. Lehr, EEOC Case-Handling Procedures, 34 ALA.
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Hearing before House Comm. on Appropriations, 102d Cong., 1st Session (1986), at 332, 338. See also Neal
Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955 (1993). By the mid-1990s, systemic
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See EEOC, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PLAN (1995), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/nep.cfm. Unlike during the Reagan and Bush I administrations, the EEOC during
the Bush II years never disavowed interest in systemic litigation; indeed, the 2006 Task Force review and resulting
reforms took place during the Bush administration.
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agency’s litigation docket. These are the cases that receive attention in congressional oversight
hearings, and that the EEOC features in its annual reports, 90 agency histories, 91 and the like.
The EEOC sees itself as not only bearing the responsibility to bring cases attacking
systemic discrimination, but also having a particular ability to do so. As the Task Force argued:
For several reasons, EEOC is also uniquely positioned to litigate systemic cases.
First, unlike private litigants, EEOC need not meet the stringent requirements of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to maintain a class suit in
federal court. Second, as a practical matter, EEOC may be able to bring certain
systemic cases that the private bar is not likely to handle, for example, where the
monetary relief might be limited, the focus is on injunctive relief, or the victims
are in underserved communities. . . . Finally, the Task Force believes that
EEOC’s nationwide presence permits it to act as a large yet highly specialized law
firm with a unique role in civil rights enforcement. 92
But the Commission has not necessarily been successful in fully leveraging these advantages.
The Task Force report itself criticized the agency’s failure to bring more such cases, noting that
while the “EEOC has successfully investigated, conciliated and litigated numerous systemic
cases,” the Commission “does not consistently and proactively identify systemic
discrimination.” 93 Observers agree both that the cases are important, and that the EEOC has not
paid them sufficient attention. For example, Selmi has criticized the EEOC for “concentrate[ing]
on individual rather than class action litigation” 94 that could help revive the public nature of the
civil rights suits.
Regardless of whether the EEOC could have done more to pursue systemic
discrimination, the agency is clearly an important subject of study for understanding litigation as
a means to structural reform of the workplace. Although private litigants bring the bulk of
federal lawsuits under Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes, only a tiny
proportion of these—between 0.6 and 1.1% during our period of study—are class actions. 95
Moreover, as Selmi has argued, class action cases are not necessarily about structural reform;
private litigants may be primarily pursuing monetary relief, rather than reform of the
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workplace. 96 In contrast, the EEOC has expressly argued for the importance of structural reform
cases and its public statements suggest that it views them as a particularly significant part of its
work. 97 Systemic cases (using our criteria) amounted to 5-11% of its litigation docket during the
period we here examine.
Because the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Wal-Mart appears to make it more
difficult to certify employment discrimination class actions, 98 the EEOC’s efforts in seeking
relief for groups of workers will gain in significance. As discussed above, the EEOC is not
required to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 in order to pursue broad-based claims of
discrimination and observers expect that it will play a larger role in pursuing systemic
discrimination in the future. 99 Understanding its injunctive practices is thus crucial for assessing
existing theories of structural reform and considering the prospects for such efforts in the future.
We begin with close study of three of the EEOC’s systemic cases, examining their litigation
history and the terms on which they were resolved in order to gain insight into the EEOC’s
injunctive practices during the period of our study.
III.

The Case Studies

In order to get a textured sense of the EEOC’s systemic cases, we undertook three case
studies by interviewing the lawyers involved and closely examining the case documents. The
first case, EEOC v. Dial Corporation, 100 alleged sexual harassment of women workers. In the
second, EEOC v. McKesson Water Products, 101 the Commission joined with private counsel and
a non-profit public interest organization to sue over discriminatory pay of African-American
truck drivers. And in the third, the EEOC brought two separate lawsuits, each captioned EEOC
v. PJAX, 102 on theories of sex and disability discrimination. Dial has some, though not all, of the
attributes the gladiator theory might predict; McKesson might look somewhat familiar to a
collaboration theorist; and the result obtained in PJAX largely fits the managerialism description.
As part IV will confirm, however, PJAX is most typical of the EEOC’s systemic docket.
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Selmi, supra note 18, at 1297.

97

See, e.g., supra note 90, at 10.

98

See supra note 3.

99

See infra Introduction.

100

EEOC v. Dial, 156 F.Supp.2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 1:99-cv-03356, filed May 20, 1999); documents and
information available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=7947.
101

EEOC v. McKesson Water Products, No. 2:01-cv-09496-FMC-PJW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 5, 2001);
documents and other information available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9099.
102

EEOC v. PJAX, 2:03-cv-00759-TFM-IJS (W.D. Penn., filed May 27, 2003) was a sexual harassment case;
documents and other information available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8756. EEOC v. PJAX,
1:03-cv-01535-JFM (D. Md., filed May 27, 2003), concerned hiring; documents and other information available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8801.
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A. Dial 103: A gladiator case?
In 1996, Beverly Allen, an employee at the Dial Corporation’s soap manufacturing plant,
in Illinois, filed a charge with the EEOC, in which she claimed repeat and severe harassment
from 1992 through 1995, and retaliation for complaints about that harassment. The EEOC took
over two years to investigate; in March 1998, it made a “reasonable cause” finding in her favor.
Statutorily required attempts at conciliation made little progress. The EEOC requested $300,000
(the statutory cap) in damages for Allen; Dial offered $5000. The positions on injunctive relief
were similarly far apart. One of the EEOC’s attorneys recalls that the EEOC insisted on a classwide settlement but that Dial was equally resolute that it would deal only with the charging
party’s grievance. 104 Accordingly, the EEOC filed suit in May 1999, alleging a pattern and
practice of sex discrimination by creation of a hostile work environment thick with sexual
harassment and sex-based harassment, 105 and sought monetary relief for all those who had
suffered harassment, as well as prospective injunctive relief.
This case might be thought to meet the “gladiator” description. Dial, a billion dollar
company, 106 was a free-spending opponent, and the litigation was intense and extremely
contentious. Dial hired Seyfarth Shaw, an employer-side employment litigation firm with a
national reputation for aggressive defense tactics. Among other defenses, Dial attacked the
sufficiency of the notice it received during the administrative process, the Commission’s
jurisdiction over the broad pattern-or-practice case, and the conciliation process. 107 It attacked,
as well, the very idea of systemic litigation in a sexual harassment case, and the merits of the
EEOC’s case.
Judge Warren Urbom, a Nixon appointee to the District of Nebraska sitting by
designation in the Northern District of Chicago, rejected these arguments in a thorough opinion
in 2001. The EEOC’s evidence suggested “that the work environment at [Dial] was sexually
charged in a way that was offensive and demeaning to women.” It detailed extensive sexual
behavior targeting dozens of women, including male employees touching women's breasts and
buttocks, exposing themselves to their female co-workers or touching their genitals while
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This case study is based on review of the district court case docket, the Complaint, six district court opinions,
the Consent Decree, several press releases, and three monitors’ reports, and as well as on Schlanger’s interviews of
monitors Reginald Jones and Nancy Kreiter and EEOC lawyers Noelle Brennan, Jean Powers Kamp, and John
Hendrickson. For the documents, see supra note 100; notes from the interviews are on file with the authors.
104

Telephone Interview with Noelle Brennan, former EEOC attorney (Oct. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Brennan
interview].
105

Complaint at 2, EEOC v. Dial (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 1:99-cv-03356, May 20, 1999).

106

See Press Release, EEOC, Judge in Dial Sexual Harassment Case Denies Soap Maker’s ‘Eve of Trial’ Bid on
Punitive Damages Issue, (Apr. 24, 2003), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-24-03-b.html, and at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-IL-0075-0008.pdf. Dial was acquired by the German conglomerate
Henkel Corporation in 2004 for $2.85 billion. See Henkel Annual Report 2004, at 60, available at
http://www.henkel.com/com/content_data/2005.02.22_FY_2004_annualreport_en.pdf.
107

See Docket, EEOC v. Dial (N.D. Ill. 2011) (No. 1:99-cv-03356, filed May 20, 1999), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-IL-0075-9000.pdf.
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making suggestive or threatening remarks, as well as open displays of sexually explicit
materials. 108
For two years, the case proceeded towards jury trial, which was eventually scheduled for
April 28, 2003. 109 In the months prior to trial, Judge Urbom rejected a number of Dial’s attempts
to limit the introduction of various types of evidence against it and also held that if the jury
hearing the liability case decided in favor of liability, that same jury could then assess punitive
damages as well. The EEOC’s attorneys explain that this was a crucial pro-plaintiff ruling,
allowing the EEOC to present its case in the way most likely to convince the jury to make a large
punitive damages award. Regional attorney John Hendrickson, the lead EEOC lawyer on the
case (and described by one of the case’s monitors as “probably the most successful EEOC
lawyer in the country” 110) gives much of the credit for the subsequent settlement to that ruling; it
provided, he says, “powerful leverage,” 111 because it allowed the EEOC to “structure the case for
trial in a way that was, we thought, equitable but very favorable.” 112 The most crucial incentive
to settle, however, was the prospect of the impending trial. Hendrickson recalls that at a
technology run-through in the courtroom on the Friday before the Monday trial was scheduled to
start, it was clear to the defendants—both the corporate people and the lawyers—that the EEOC
was more than ready for trial. Even more important, he believes, was that the trial would likely
have been a public relations disaster for Dial. Dial’s status as a familiar household brand
(“Aren’t you glad you use Dial? Don’t you wish everybody did?”), joined with the dramatic
accusations of sexual misconduct on the plant floor, made the case very interesting to the press.
The result was, he says, “the folks in the main corporate office wanted this case done; they didn’t
want to read about it” in the newspapers. And so, Hendrickson explains, they instructed their
lawyers to “settle this god-damned case.” 113
But with the trial scheduled to begin in just a couple of days, there was not much time to
negotiate. Judge Urbom was clear; he was holding a trial unless the parties gave him a signed
settlement by Monday morning. The negotiators needed a template, a “go-by.” They chose the
decree from a prior high-profile EEOC case, against Mitsubishi, which had been negotiated in
1998 by essentially the same team of EEOC lawyers. The Mitsubishi case had settled for $34
million.114 In the Dial settlement, Dial agreed to pay $10 million into a class fund to be
disbursed to eligible class members, women who had experienced harassment at Dial’s Illinois
facility between 1988 and 2003. The amount was at the time the second highest sexual
108

Id. at 950.
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In the meantime the EEOC filed another, unrelated case against the Dial Corporation, involving allegations of
discriminatory physical tests for factory jobs in a mean processing plant in Iowa. This matter went to trial in 2004,
and Dial was assessed over $3 million in back-pay, a judgment affirmed by the 7th Circuit in 2007. See
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9306. See EEOC v. Dial Corp., No. 3:02-CV-10109, 2005 WL 2839977
(S.D. Iowa Sept. 29, 2005) aff'd in part and remanded, 469 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2006)
110

Telephone Interview with George F. Galland, Dial Monitor (Oct. 28, 2009).
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Telephone Interview with John Hendrickson, EEOC Regional Attorney (Oct. 16, 2009).
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Id.
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Id.
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EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 990 F.Supp. 1059 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (No. 1:96-cv-01192-JBM,
filed Apr. 9, 1996); for documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9787.
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harassment settlement in the Commission’s history, 115 and the fourth highest award in any type
of case in the time here studied. The EEOC and an appointed Special Master were assigned to
allocate the funds among the various claimants, with no claimant to receive more than $300,000.
About 90 claimants received an average of $110,000 each. The settlement also contained a great
many injunctive provisions, some very ordinary but others quite unusual in EEOC litigation.
To begin with the ordinary: the Dial decree had a typical “thou shalt not” section,
prohibiting sexual harassment and retaliation:
Dial and its officers, agents, management (including supervisory employees) . . .
are enjoined, from: (i) discriminating against women on the basis of sex; (ii)
engaging in or being a party to any action, policy or practice that is intended to or
is known to them to have the effect of sexually harassing or intimidating any
female employee on the basis of her gender; and/or (iii) creating, facilitating or
tolerating the existence of a work environment that is sexually hostile to female
employees.
Dial and its officers, agents, management (including supervisory employees) . . .
are enjoined, from: engaging in, implementing or tolerating any action, policy or
practice with the purpose of retaliating against any current or former employee of
Dial because he or she opposed any practice of sexual harassment made unlawful
under Title VII . . . 116
These sorts of clauses are all-but-universal in the EEOC’s decrees, systemic and non-systemic
alike. As is obvious, they do not add anything substantive to the obligations imposed by Title
VII and the other anti-discrimination statutes. Rather, their function is to abbreviate the remedial
process in the event of a violation, rendering the employer subject to immediate court
intervention without a new charging party, statutory conciliation process, and new district court
complaint.
In another provision typical in EEOC systemic cases, Dial agreed to various revisions of
its “No Harassment Policy” and its complaint procedure. For example, Dial agreed to revise its
policies to “enable complaining parties to be interviewed by Dial about their complaints in such
a manner that permits the complaining party, at such party’s election, to provide information in a
confidential manner.” 117 As in nearly all the EEOC’s decrees, Dial also agreed to train line staff
and supervisors in their obligation to avoid sexual harassment, and anyone with responsibility for
complaints in how to respond to complaints. 118 And Dial agreed to post notices throughout its

115

In 1998, the Commission reached a $34 million settlement against Mitsubishi, and a $9.85 million settlement
against the pharmaceutical company Astra. See EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 1999 WL 342043 (D. Mass 1999) (No.
4:98-cv-40014-NMG,
filed
Jan.
5,
1998);
for
documents
and
information,
see
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8308; Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., supra note 114.
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Consent Decree at 4-5, EEOC v. Dial (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 1:99-cv-03356, May 9, 2003).
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Id. at 11.
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Id. at 12.
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plant explaining the decree and the anti-harassment policy 119—yet another all-but-universal
provision of the EEOC’s decrees.
The Dial decree looked much less typical in other ways, however. First, Dial agreed to
incorporate EEO principles into its employee performance management; the decree included a
number of “policies designed to promote supervisor accountability,” promising to discipline any
supervisor who engaged in or tolerated sexual harassment, 120 and to “link” “evaluation of [each]
supervisor’s handling of equal employment opportunity issues . . . directly to supervisor
salary/bonus structure.” 121 In addition, the Decree gave specified outsiders extensive workplace
authority and access; Dial agreed to give monitoring authority to three “consent decree
monitors”—one picked by Dial, one by the EEOC, and the Chair by both parties.
The EEOC’s Hendrickson explains that the ideal monitor combines “fundamental
dedication to equity and civil rights in the workplace” with “steel in their spine” and a probusiness attitude. 122 “To be effective,” he says, a monitor “needs to see that business can do
better without discriminating, and to want to show the business how,” and “needs to have a
tough side but also to be diplomatic.” 123 The parties picked three monitors with substantial
backgrounds in employment anti-discrimination. Nancy Kreiter, chosen by the EEOC, had
previously been a monitor in the Mitsubishi case and the research director of the nonprofit
organization Women Employed. Reginald Jones was Dial’s pick; just finished with his service
as one of President Clinton’s Republican appointees to the EEOC itself, he had before that been
a partner at Seyfarth Shaw, Dial’s law firm. The EEOC and Dial together picked George
Galland as the monitors’ chair; Galland, like Kreiter, had played the same role in the Mitsubishi
case.
The three decree monitors were assigned to evaluate and recommend changes to “all
existing employment policies, procedures and practices” relating to the subject matter of the
case. Dial agreed in advance to implement all recommended changes, unless the Court permitted
otherwise after hearing Dial’s objections. The monitors also had reporting obligations; they were
to assess Dial’s compliance with the decree and the effectiveness of its policies in achieving nonharassment. The Chair of the decree monitoring panel was also given investigation and appeal
authority over harassment complaints. 124
Appointing outside monitors is a fairly standard remedy in much civil rights injunctive
litigation, but relatively uncommon in EEOC cases. Although outsiders were brought in as
consultants in about 12% of the EEOC’s systemic cases in our sample, in less than 4%—just 9
cases over the entire decade—were they named as “monitors” and given concomitant stature.
Perhaps the outsider received greater access in the Dial case because of the scope of the
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Consent Decree, EEOC v. Dial, supra note 116, at 11.
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Hendrickson interview, supra note 111.
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Consent Decree at 15, EEOC v. Dial, supra note 116.

- 22 https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/89

22

Schlanger and Kim:

violations, or because the EEOC’s own relationship with Dial was insufficiently cordial 125 to
make monitoring by the EEOC palatable or productive. Or perhaps the EEOC thought that it
needed more thoroughgoing change and that an HR person who answered to Dial managers
would lack the independence or authority to implement it. EEOC Regional Attorney John
Hendrickson explains that the EEOC seeks imposition of a monitor or monitors only where “the
situation is pretty egregious.” 126 And the EEOC’s lawyers we interviewed agreed that when a
settlement seems to need a great deal of followup, they try to get a monitor or consultant
appointed rather than seeking themselves to get inside and change the corporate culture.
Lawyers, they say, typically move on to the next case; corporate culture change is what monitors
are for. In this case, the monitors were quite active. They surveyed and interviewed dozens,
even hundreds of employees, developed policy, reviewed online training, and generally
supervised anti-harassment activities for a period of two-and-a-half years.
The settlement terms just described might appear to support a collaborationist account.
But that’s not the approach the parties describe. Monitor Nancy Kreiter says, for example, that
where some firms facing monitorships “want to take advantage of the consent decree, and
become a model,” Dial was more interested in a more limited version of compliance. 127 The
reason, it seems, was the continuation of the conflictual mindset after the settlement. Dial’s
lawyers and officers did not agree to our interview requests, but the EEOC’s lawyers believe that
the settlement was forced on Dial’s lawyers by its business people for business reasons. It was
the impending public relations fiasco, not a sudden conviction that Dial had done anything
wrong, that drove the settlement—and defense counsel’s unhappiness was palpable to the
participants even at the press conference announcing the purportedly amicable resolution. Over
the next several years, lawyers continued to run the compliance process (Dial apparently had a
very small and quite uninvolved HR department), and continued to believe that their company
had been unfairly accused. The litigation mindset was marked enough that Dial’s own chosen
monitor, Reginald Jones, hinted several years later at the problems caused. Jones wrote an
article entitled “Ten Tips for Class Action Consent Decree Settlement Survival,” 128 and listed as
Item 1:
Settle if you want to or litigate if you must. Don’t try to do both in the consent
decree. . . . Parties . . . first need to let go of the allegations, facts and issues that
prompted the litigation in the first place. . . . If any party insists on continuing to
try to vindicate their litigation posture they will subvert the healing and
normalization that the settlement contemplates.
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In addition to the case profiled here and the 2002 Iowa case mentioned above, the EEOC litigated a third
major case against Dial, dealing with sexual harassment, in the early 1990s. EEOC v. Dial Corp., No. 4:95-cv01726 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 13, 1995) [CK]. This kind of litigation history against the same employer by the Commission
is quite uncommon, even for a company as large as Dial—after all, the EEOC brings only a few hundred cases each
year, nationwide.
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By contrast, he describes “serious money” as “the lingua franca of business” and therefore more universally
sought. Hendrickson interview, supra note 111.
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Telephone Interview with Nancy Kreiter, Dial Monitor (Nov. 18, 2009).
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Reginald E. Jones, Ten Tips for Class Action Consent Decree Settlement Survival, THE PRACTICAL
LITIGATOR, Sept. 2006, available at http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/2005/022.pdf.
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Even so, the required monitoring reports suggest that the environment at the Dial plant improved
substantially over the life of the decree; surveyed employees reported that the sexual harassment
they had seen in the past was no longer tolerated or present. 129
It is worth noting, too, that while there was ongoing conflict, no post-decree disputes
developed into litigated enforcement of any type; the docket is devoid of post-decree
interventions. 130 As one of the monitors describes it, “There was resistance, at various points, to
things we suggested, but not resistance that ever stopped anything from happening that we
thought should happen.” Management “moaned and groaned and hollered and screamed behind
the scenes,” but never actually got to the point of contesting anything the monitors did. 131
This case was an outlier in several ways. Its use of a monitoring team—shared with just
4% of the systemic docket—has already been noted. It also had more motions than usual—23,
which puts it at the 98th percentile in the sample. And it took longer than usual to come to
closure—nearly 4 years (97th percentile). Its decree is relatively long—19 pages (76th
percentile). But even as an outlier, while the case clearly generated considerable heat, the
conflict was, contra the gladiator theory, insufficient to drive anyone back into court after the
settlement.
B. McKesson Water Products 132: Collaborationist?
In 1998 Steven Crutchfield and eight other African-American employees filed charges
with the EEOC accusing their employer of race discrimination in pay and work assignments.
The charging parties worked for Sparkletts, a water delivery company owned by McKesson
Water Products, a billion dollar processor, marketer, and distributor of bottled water. The
complainants alleged that African-American drivers were assigned routes in low-income
neighborhoods, which were often less profitable than routes in more affluent areas, and then paid
them on the basis of their routes’ profitability. Crutchfield’s cousin’s husband was Antonio
Lawson, an experienced class action employment lawyer in private practice, and Lawson
represented the complaining employees from the start. He was able to devote substantial
resources to it because of a grant he received from the Impact Fund, 133 an organization that
provides support to small firms litigating big civil rights cases. 134 As Lawson described the
allegations later, “Black drivers understood that they would work the so-called ‘ghetto routes’
while Beverly Hills would be handled by white drivers.” 135 The EEOC’s investigation supported
129

See, e.g., Second Year Report of the Consent Decree Monitors, EEOC v. Dial (N.D. Ill. 2011) (No. 1:99-cv03356, May 24, 2005); Final Report of the Consent Decree Monitors to the Parties and the Court, EEOC v. Dial
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (No. 1:99-cv-03356, Oct. 26, 2005).
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This case study is based on court papers and interviews with EEOC lawyers Anna Park and Dana Johnson,
Consultant Heidi Olguin, and class counsel Antonio Lawson, Kendra Tanacea, and Jocelyn Larkin. We were unable
to obtain interviews of lawyers or management for the defendant.
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Telephone Interview with Attorney Antonio Lawson (Nov. 4, 2009).
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See http://www.impactfund.org/index.php?cat_id=4.
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Court Approves $1.2 Million Settlement Between EEOC and McKesson for Race Discrimination, March 6,
2002, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/3-6-02.html and at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EECA-0138-0003.pdf.
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the charging parties’ claims. At that point, the Commission and the parties entered into
settlement negotiations. At first those negotiations went nowhere—Lawson describes McKesson
as “adamant that they weren’t going to settle.” 136 McKesson brought in outside counsel and
began a competing analysis of the racial impact of Sparkletts route assignments. But then
McKesson sold Sparkletts to Danone, the much larger French company best known in the U.S.
for its Dannon yogurt. 137 Danone’s French management had a completely different view about
the matter; Danone didn’t want the U.S. government as an opponent, and also felt much less
loyalty to local management. Indeed, French management got very much involved, even flying
over to negotiate settlement terms. In addition, Danone’s American general counsel, who was
African American, was very interested in cleaning shop in its new acquisition. 138
On November 5, 2001, the parties filed, simultaneously, the EEOC’s complaint, a private
intervenors’ complaint, class certification papers, and a proposed consent decree. Judge
Florence-Marie Cooper, a district judge appointed by President Clinton to the Central District of
California, in Los Angeles, held a preliminary hearing on class certification later that month, and
a fairness hearing in February 2002, at which she approved the settlement. Under the agreement,
85 current and former employees, and their lawyers, received $1.7 million from Danone.
Danone also agreed to injunctive relief and monitoring of that relief’s implementation.
As one would expect in an EEOC case, the decree prohibited discrimination, mandated
development of an anti-discrimination policy, and required EEO training for employees. It also
included substantial document retention and reporting requirements, to enable the plaintiffs’
counsel and the EEOC to monitor compliance and progress. Like the Dial decree, the McKesson
decree had several provisions for bringing in outsiders—here, an “EEO consultant”—to assist
and sometimes to decide various issues.
But even more than the Dial decree just described, and unlike the PJAX decree described
next, the McKesson decree departed considerably from most of the EEOC’s decrees, in a variety
of ways. First, the role of plaintiffs’ counsel was much more pronounced; responsibility for
policy development was shared in the first instance not only by the EEO consultant and the
defendant, but also by private class counsel and the EEOC. Second, the decree intervened much
more deeply than the typical case in the basic employment terms for the drivers. Pay went from
commission to an hourly wage, 139 and—guided, class counsel Tony Lawson says, by workers’
preferences—route assignments went from discretionary to seniority-based. 140 This involvement
of the workers in deciding the foundational issue of how pay and route assignments would be
structured is the closest thing we found in all our research to a collaborationist dynamic.
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Even so, the decree was also notably managerialist—implementing management
practices widely accepted quite apart from any civil rights impact. Indeed, a third unusual
feature of the decree was its very high level of detail aimed at bureaucratizing and standardizing
the hiring, assignment, and promotion processes. For example, the Decree provides:
[The defendant] shall conspicuously post all openings in Class Positions as well
as any open positions for Managers using an Open Position Notice. An opening
is defined as any position, including route assignments and special assignment in
the Los Angeles Metro Region other than a temporary vacancy of less than thirty
days. For each opening, the Open Position Notice shall list the minimum
qualifications for the position, the expected starting date, the procedure for
submitting a bid, the deadline for submitting a bid, and the location/availability of
the Job Description for the position, and the salary and, if bonus and commissions
are part of the compensation for the position, average earnings potential for the
route or position. The Open Position Notice shall be posted for a minimum of ten
(10) business days in all facilities within the Los Angeles Metro Region, in a
location that is readily accessible to all employees. The Successor shall also post
all job openings covered by this Decree on an online system accessible to all
employees. 141
The decree sets out similarly detailed provisions governing job bidding, route-assignment
criteria, and route compensation.
Asked how the decree got so detailed, the participants report several causes. Private
plaintiffs’ counsel emphasize their overall approach. They had a good deal of experience
negotiating non-EEOC consent decrees, and tended, they themselves say, to take what some
might consider an “overinclusive” approach to decree terms. And because they had negotiated
many prior decrees, including in some large cases 142 they had many models to choose from. In
addition, both the plaintiffs’ lawyers and EEOC’s counsel reports that the impetus towards detail
came equally from defendants’ in-house lawyers, who wanted specificity so they could ensure
their company’s compliance. 143 Perhaps because of the recent corporate acquisition of
Sparkletts, in-house counsel “just didn’t have faith in the local managers, and wanted to take
away as much as possible their ability to get out from underneath” the decree. 144
A fourth important difference between the McKesson decree and most EEOC decrees is
its five-year term—exceptionally long for an EEOC settlement. (For more on decree length, see
Table 5, row 3). Additionally, the settlement did not entirely quantify attorneys’ fees. The
decree awarded plaintiffs’ private counsel $412,000 for their prior work, but Danone agreed to
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Amended Consent Decree, supra note 139, at 14.
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Tony Lawson had worked for a number of years with long-time civil rights plaintiffs’ counsel Guy
Saperstein, and he and his colleague Kendra Tanacea were able to review many large-scale decrees, picking
provisions to use as models. Lawson Interview, supra note 133; Telephone Interview with Attorney Kendra
Tanacea (Nov. 5, 2009).
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pay unspecified future fees for securing approval of the decree and implementing it over that
five-year term.
Finally, the resulting implementation process was unusually comprehensive. Heidi-Jane
Olguin, president of a civil rights consulting company called Progressive Management Resources
(and married to a federal district judge who had previously been a civil rights lawyer 145), was
hired as a consultant; she and her partner worked extremely closely with both class counsel and
management. The consultants provided training and were responsible for meeting the reporting
requirements. It was even their phone number that was posted for reporting any subsequent
complaints by employees. 146 They coordinated and led the drafting of new policy, at meetings
involving Danone management and class counsel (but not the EEOC). 147 And class counsel,
their time paid for by Danone under the decree, worked many many hours. One of the lawyers,
Kendra Tanacea, remembers the effort in detail: “Our aim was to go into the company; we’d
have 6:30 am meetings and explain the consent decree. . . . We went to every drivers’ room.
Oxnard, Covina—Lancaster was the furthest out, a couple in downtown L.A. Maybe 12
branches. And we did it several times over the years. And then they would have a couple of
Saturday half-day trainings on new policies and discrimination and ‘train the trainer’ exercises.
We were part of all that.” 148
As in the Dial litigation, where interview subjects emphasized that cases that required
monitoring required outsiders, our interview subjects agree that the EEOC simply does not do
this kind of monitoring. Class counsel Tony Lawson counted this as a failing: the EEOC has “all
these lawyers all over the country,” he said. “They should hire some to monitor decrees. . . . Too
often they just sign off and there’s an agreement to make changes, but they don’t follow up.”149
The EEOC’s own lawyers confirmed that time-consuming monitoring is not their priority,
although they obviously offered a somewhat different spin, explaining why private lawyers
might be more interested in a collaborative approach than the EEOC is. Anna Park explained
that when the EEOC is doing the monitoring, its lawyers think of compliance as pretty cut and
dried: “For us, you comply [or] you don’t comply. On the key terms, we’re not really willing to
budge.” Private monitoring “might create a different dynamic,” she said, in part because those
monitors are “paid by the company to monitor”; in those circumstances, the business model
encourages getting along, and working things through. “There’s nothing wrong with
collaboration,” she emphasized: “if the company says, well, what do you think is a better way to
do it, and they listen to the answer, that’s fine.” But there’s always the danger that what
collaboration actually means is undue flexibility: “it’s a strange dynamic, if the company is
paying the lawyers. It’s a business.” 150

145

On
Ms.
Olguin’s
husband,
District
Judge
Fernando
Olguin,
see
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3454; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/14/presidentobama-nominates-two-serve-us-district-court.
146

Telephone Interview with Heidi-Jane Olguin,, President, Progressive Management Resources (Nov. 5, 2009).

147

Olguin interview, supra note 146; Tanacea interview, supra note 142. [confirm EEOC absence]

148

Tanacea interview, supra note 142.

149

Lawson interview, supra note 133.

150

Telephone Interview with Anna Park, EEOC Regional Attorney (Nov. 20, 2009).
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There is clearly money to be made in monitoring systemic decrees, both for plaintiffs’
lawyers and monitors or consultants. But Lawson emphasizes that only a very few firms are
willing to put in the work, which is far from glamorous, attracts no headlines, and receives only
hourly compensation with no possibility of a large payoff: “Very few private lawyers write into
settlements the degree of monitoring that we did in McKesson. For the first year after the decree,
we lived in L.A.; we were there every week. [Danone] knew we’d be there, staying involved.
That meant they sent enough people to the meetings and kept things moving. That was how you
assure that there’s more than changes in HR policy. Private lawyers often don’t do that. . . . It’s
rare to have firms stay involved and do monitoring.”
So if McKesson is a collaborative case, the features that put it in that category seem,
interestingly, to stem from the involvement of a class counsel with unusually pronounced public
interest orientation and experience, and an unusually high level of interest in implementation,
whether because of its results or the regular compensation that accompanied the requisite hours
upon hours of effort. And it seems likely that the other unusual features of the case—the high
level of detail and the concern for class counsel’s compensation—all stem from the same causes.
C. PJAX 151: Managerialism
Our third case, PJAX, is more typical of the EEOC’s systemic litigation than either Dial
or McKesson. In 1999 and 2000 a number of employees filed discrimination charges with the
EEOC against PJAX, a large Pennsylvania-based shipping company. The first complaint alleged
gender-based harassment and disparagement; women told the EEOC stories of being screamed at
by managers and owners using sexually derogatory terms, and of gender-specific requirements
that they perform personal chores for the owners such as picking up laundry and having the
owners' personal cars cleaned. One complainant said she was asked by a PJAX manager to
perform sexual favors for his bookie, in order to reduce his gambling debt. In addition, other
employees alleged that PJAX refused to hire older applicants, women, and people with
disabilities for positions as drivers or dockworkers, and that it retaliated against those who
protested against discrimination.
The charges were filed in two EEOC offices, in Pittsburgh and in Baltimore. The
resulting investigations were apparently only loosely coordinated, 152 but it seems the
unsuccessful conciliation negotiations occurred jointly. PJAX’s counsel complains that the
EEOC did not try in good faith to conciliate the case 153; the EEOC’s Maryland lawyer reports of
PJAX that “they didn’t seem to take conciliation very seriously.” 154 In May 2003, the EEOC
simultaneously brought two suits in two different U.S. district courts; a case in the Western
151

This case study is based on review of two cases, both captioned EEOC v. PJAX, one in the Western District
of Pennsylvania, the other in the District of Maryland. The available documents in each include the district court
case docket, the Complaint, the EEOC’s filed Complaint, and the Consent Decree. In addition, Schlanger conducted
telephone interviews of PJAX’s lawyer, Scott Hardy, and EEOC lawyers Jean Clickner, and Debra Lawrence.
Notes from the interviews are on file with the authors.
152

Telephone Interview with M. Jean Clickner, EEOC attorney (Oct. 20, 2009); Telephone Interview with Debra
M. Lawrence, EEOC attorney (November 4, 2009).
153

Telephone Interview with W. Scott Hardy, partner, Cohen & Grisby (Oct. 30, 2009).

154

Lawrence interview, supra note 152.
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District of Pennsylvania focused on the sexual harassment charges while one in the District of
Maryland alleged discriminatory failures to hire.
Like the investigation, the litigation process proceeded without much coordination
between the two suits on the EEOC’s part, although the two cases were inextricably linked in the
minds of the defendants. PJAX’s lawyer, Scott Hardy, felt that the sexual harassment case, in
Pittsburgh, “interjected a lot more emotion.” It was the sexual harassment case that interested
the press, which (following the EEOC’s standard procedure) was notified by press release when
the litigation commenced. PJAX at the time described the sexual harassment allegations as
“unfounded and salacious.” 155 Even six years later, in an interview, Hardy continued to describe
the sexual harassment case as “vicious.” 156 Far from encouraging settlement, in his view those
accusations “caused people to be entrenched and to want to defend themselves even more, and
held up the resolution of the Baltimore [hiring] case.” The EEOC’s lawyers, of course, saw
things differently. Jean Clickner, the EEOC’s lawyer in the Pittsburgh case, describes the sexual
harassment that was the subject of that case as “over the top outrageous” and “really just
endemic.” 157 And the EEOC’s lawyers thought the resulting litigation provided pressure that
was useful in resolving both cases. Debra Lawrence, who worked on the Baltimore case,
explained, “I guess information sharing and coordinating our efforts makes us stronger; they
throw a right punch out of Pittsburgh and we throw a left punch here.” 158
Notwithstanding the heat engendered by the case, there was no gladiator-style litigation.
The cases were settled, together, by the defendants and the EEOC’s general counsel’s office
about six months after they were filed, without significant litigation. (The length of litigation
puts PJAX at the 15 percentile on this measure; see Table 5.) Under the sexual harassment
consent decree, PJAX agreed to pay $500,000; $300,000 in compensatory damages to the
charging party and another $200,000 to be shared by four other claimants. In addition, the court
order enjoined PJAX from subjecting female employees to an unlawful hostile work
environment and required the company to revise its anti-discrimination policy to include a
grievance process, confidential investigation procedures, and anti-retaliation provisions, and to
provide anti-harassment equal employment training by an outside source to its employees.
The failure-to-hire decree involved more money and more injunctive relief. Under it,
PJAX paid $2 million: $200,500 to one of the charging parties, a manager who complained he’d
been fired in retaliation for protesting against discriminatory hiring practices; $25,000 to a
charging party who complained she was refused employment because of her sex and age; and a
total of $1.775 million to about 100 unnamed employees—qualified females who applied for
driver and/or dockworker positions over the three prior years but were rejected because of their
sex; and qualified applicants for driver and dockworker positions in the same period who were
rejected because of their disabilities. In addition, PJAX agreed to give all class members priority
hiring consideration.

155

Lou Ransom, U.S. Files Sex-Harassment Lawsuits Against Trucking Company, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., May
28, 2003.
156

Hardy interview, supra note 154.

157

Clickner interview, supra note 152.

158

Lawrence interview, supra note 152.

- 29 Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

29

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 89 [2013]

The more general injunctive provisions of the decree were imposed for two years (just
below the median, in the systemic docket), and required PJAX to reform its HR practices. First
were the standard “thou shalt not” clauses:
PJAX, its officers, agents, servants, employees and all persons acting or claiming
to act in its behalf and interest hereby agree to comply with the provisions of Title
VII and the ADEA and agree in this Decree to be enjoined, and are enjoined, from
refusing to hire female applicants for employment because of their sex and/or age
and from utilizing disparate qualifications for male and female applicants. 159
In addition, as per usual, the PJAX decree required antidiscrimination training for all employees
who dealt with hiring, and the posting of antidiscrimination policies at all its facilities and
terminals nationwide.
The decree also required moderately detailed quarterly reporting to the EEOC on hiring
activity. This too is extremely prevalent in EEOC decrees. The idea is presumably to (a) allow
the EEOC to monitor whether the defendant is actually reforming, and (b) induce such reform by
the in terrorem effect of the defendant’s awareness that it is being closely watched. For
whatever reason, there was no post-decretal activity on either cases’ docket sheet. As discussed
above, however, it would be difficult for the EEOC’s lawyers to devote enough time to this kind
of followup to make it a strong tool. About 18% of the EEOC’s systemic cases are like Dial and
McKesson, designating an outsider to serve as consultant or monitor. But in another 12% of its
decrees, the EEOC seeks to deputize someone within a defendant organization who is likely to
have both expertise and a commitment to the value the EEOC is trying to protect. Such
deputation was a very important part of the PJAX case, both sides agree. Rather than itself
engage in a collaboration with PJAX, and rather than designating a consultant, monitor, or
workers to do so, the EEOC obtained agreement, by decree, that PJAX would create a “Human
Resources Specialist” position and fill that role with someone who had “a professional
background in the field of human resources.” As a mild check on its choice, PJAX was required
to report to the EEOC the designated employee’s name and experience. It was then the HR
specialist’s task to ensure compliance with equal opportunity laws at all facilities and terminals
nationwide, to “promot[e] employment opportunities for females in the traditionally male jobs of
driver and dockworker,” and to investigate complaints. 160
More particularly, the HR specialist was to be assigned a variety of tasks that would
solidify and standardize recruitment and hiring process, including “development of defined,
uniform, objective, job-related qualifications for the positions of driver and dockworker,” and
“objective, defined, uniform, and published procedures for hiring.” 161 In addition, the HR
specialist would “implement[] defined and consistent job application, record-keeping, and
records retention procedures, including the development and retention of applicant flow data.”162
These types of bureaucratization are prevalent remedies in the EEOC’s decrees; designed of
159

Consent Decree at 9, EEOC v. PJAX, 1:03-cv-01535-JFM (D. Md., Nov. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-MD-0093-0002.pdf.
160

Id.

161

Id. at 10.

162

Id.
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course, to minimize the opportunity for bias to operate and to facilitate both internal and external
monitoring. About half of the Commission’s decrees in systemic decrees relating to hiring or
promotion include like provisions.
It should be apparent, then, that the PJAX decree fails to conform to either the gladiator
or collaboration theories. It demonstrates neither long-term high stakes conflict nor much by
way of ongoing and creative collaboration between either the EEOC or workers on the one hand
and PJAX on the other. Instead, what seems to be going on is, even more than in the McKesson
case, is managerialism—and here, the priority given to standard (often non-civil-rights-related)
management techniques is coupled with designation of a particular manager, a human resources
specialist, to carry out those techniques. The EEOC’s role is as back-stop; compliance reporting
enabled EEOC intervention, but entirely at the EEOC’s discretion. No such intervention is
evident in the record.
We move, next, to more systematic analysis of the EEOC’s systemic docket.
IV.

A Systematic Look at the Systemic Cases—Testing the Theories

The three case studies discussed above illustrate the variety of types of injunctive relief
obtained by the EEOC during our study period. One could find some support for aspects of both
the gladiator and collaboration theories in the Dial and McKesson cases, while PJAX seemed
largely consonant with managerialist theories. But what does the EEOC’s systemic docket as a
whole reveal about the agency’s injunctive practices? In this section we undertake systematic
analysis of a large sample of the EEOC’s systemic cases.
The first step in a systematic analysis is identifying which of the EEOC’s cases are
“systemic” cases. Unfortunately, during the period of our study—cases filed from October 1997
through September 2006—the EEOC did not itself clearly identify which of its cases it viewed as
systemic. 163

163

The EEOC’s information management system did have a variable on “case type”—“I” for individual or “C”
for class—that initially seemed promising. However, during the years of this study, the category C meant only that
when a suit was filed, the EEOC’s lawyer thought it likely to benefit more than one charging party. This is clearly
not a variable that captures the concept of “systemic” litigation. (We did, however, include every case labeled C in
our sample.)
In subsequent years, as the EEOC has tried to ramp up its systemic docket, its categorization methodology has
shifted. In 2007, the EEOC operationalized the category of “systemic” using multiple “indicia”: among them were
“Commissioner charges,” “suit filing with 20+ victims,” and “suit resolution with 20+ victims.” See U.S. EEOC,
AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
HIGHLIGHTS,
FY
2007,
at
12,
available
at
PERFORMANCE
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/2007/highlights.pdf. Beginning in 2009 (under the new,
Democratic administration), the EEOC began to report the number of systemic cases brought, evidencing firmer
boundaries for categorization. See U.S. EEOC, FY 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
HIGHLIGHTS, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2009parhigh_discussion.cfm (reporting 19 new systemic
cases filed). By 2011, the Commission was counting a case as systemic more simply, if it has at least 20 known or
expected class members. See U.S. EEOC, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT HIGHLIGHTS,
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2011parhigh_discussion.cfm (The report describes 261 lawsuits filed
that year: “These included 177 individual suits, 61 multiple-victim suits (with fewer than 20 victims) and 23
systemic suits.” And it uses the same categories for the 443 cases remaining on the active docket: “116 (26 percent)
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In order to capture the cases most likely aimed at structural reform, we used seven
criteria. The first two are legal theories that suggest a collective element—allegations of a
pattern or practice of discrimination, 164 or a disparate impact claim. 165 The next two criteria
focus on the number of individuals potentially affected by the suit. Using both the EEOC’s
internal estimates of the number of benefitted persons and our count of the number of
complainants listed in the case documents, we included any cases involving 20 or more
individuals in either variable. The remaining three criteria focus on the breadth of the remedy
obtained: we include as “systemic” any case in which case documents or the EEOC’s data
indicate that 20 or more complainants received monetary relief, any case in which the EEOC
obtained relief totaling $1 million or more in real (2007) dollars, and any case with an
affirmative action remedy. The first two show that broad relief for a workforce was likely
obtained, while the presence of an affirmative action remedy again indicates a collective element
to the suit. (In addition, we limited our sample to cases against private employers, excluding the
EEOC’s age discrimination cases against governmental employers even if they would otherwise
have fit our criteria.)
Using these criteria, we identified a set of 281 cases which we refer to as the EEOC’s
“systemic cases.” 166 Table 1 lists the number of systemic cases in our sample by year, the
percentage satisfying each of our inclusion criteria, and the estimated total number of systemic
cases filed by the EEOC. 167 Our criteria cannot precisely identify those cases and only those

involved multiple aggrieved parties (but fewer than 20) and 63 (14 percent) involved challenges to systemic
discrimination.”).
164

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-6.

165

Title VII doctrine distinguishes between disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of discrimination.
In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff alleges that she suffered adverse treatment on the job and that that
treatment was motivated by her race, sex or other protected characteristic. Disparate impact cases, by contrast, do
not assume that discriminatory treatment was intentional. Rather, under a disparate impact theory, the plaintiff can
show that the employer has adopted a facially neutral employment practice—for example, requiring a certain score
on a standardized test—but that practice has a disproportionate impact on members of a protected group and is not
justified by business necessity. Disparate impact cases are necessarily class-based rather than individual claims and
are therefore systemic in nature.
166

These data are a subset of those collected in the EEOC Litigation Project. How we selected and codied data
for that project is documented in Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Margo Schlanger, EEOC LITIGATION
DATABASE CODE BOOK (2013) available at http://eeoclitigation.wustl.edu/. All of the data collected in the EEOC
Litigation Project are also available for download at that site. In brief, we began with a list of every case brought by
the EEOC between October 1997 and September 2006. From this list, we selected a stratified random sample of
cases for coding, excluding non-merits cases such as suits enforcing administrative subpoenas or administrative
conciliations. We also excluded a handful of cases that for a variety of reasons, such as unavailability of case
documents or characteristics that did not fit our target population of EEOC suits against private defendants. In total,
the Project coded information about 2316 of the EEOC’s cases filed over a 10-year period of time. Of those, 281
met one or more of our criteria for inclusion in the set of “systemic” cases analyzed here.
167

The EEOC Litigation Project includes a stratified random sample of cases. Cases classified by the EEOC as
intended to benefit more than one employee, all cases concluded by a court order, and all cases listing a trial date
were included with probability 1. The remaining cases were randomly sampled with probability of .45 of being
selected. See Kim et al, EEOC Litigation Database Code Book. Nearly all of the systemic cases—261 of 281—
came into our study with a probability of 1 based on the criteria we used for inclusion. The 20 other systemic cases
represent only 2.3% of the part of the sample randomly selected for inclusion (with probability .45). The estimated
number of non-selected cases in our target population is 1109, and so an additional 26±10 (95% confidence interval)
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cases targeting systemic discrimination; nevertheless, we believe the criteria sufficiently capture
the cases we are interested in—those aimed at structural reform of a targeted workplace. To the
extent that the EEOC pursued structural reform in its cases, we are most likely to see evidence of
it in this subset of cases.
Table 1: EEOC Systemic Cases Filed 1997-2006
Systemic
20+ class size
EEOC:
$1
EEOC
Pattern
EEOC Complainants Claimants
or
Filing cases
Est.
Disparate benefitted listed in court awarded million Affirmative
year filed Sample population Practice Impact
parties
docs
damages damages
Action
37%
11%
53%
0%
26%
42%
5%
1997
298
19
22±2
1998
373
18
21±2
28%
11%
56%
0%
33%
61%
11%
1999
437
23
27±3
48%
13%
17%
9%
4%
35%
9%
2000
288
32
36±3
47%
13%
41%
9%
13%
22%
13%
2001
382
34
37±2
38%
18%
38%
3%
21%
26%
6%
2002
327
31
35±3
42%
13%
32%
6%
16%
39%
6%
2003
363
39
43±3
56%
10%
36%
5%
18%
33%
8%
2004
375
32
37±4
63%
13%
31%
3%
0%
22%
3%
2005
380
28
34±5
61%
18%
21%
0%
7%
21%
7%
2006
373
25
30±4
64%
12%
16%
4%
4%
4%
4%
Total 3596 281
307±10
49%
13%
33%
4%
14%
29%
7%

What are these systemic cases about? Figure A reports the proportion alleging different
types of discrimination. As it illustrates, the most frequent basis of suit is sex (including
pregnancy) discrimination, asserted in over half the cases; about the same proportion of cases
allege retaliation. Race, national origin, or color discrimination claims are included in over a
third of the systemic docket. Age discrimination is less commonly alleged. And as might be
expected, disability and religious discrimination—claims that are more often individual, rather
than collective in nature—appear more rarely (and notably less frequently in the systemic docket
than the non-systemic). 168

cases from the full list would have met our criteria for inclusion in the subset of systemic cases, if we had coded
them all. Our sample of 281 thus represents the vast majority of the universe of systemic cases.
168

In our non-systemic sample, 13.1% and 6% of the cases involve claims for disability or religious
discrimination, respectively.
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Figure B reports the proportion of systemic cases raising different types of employment
issues. As it illustrates, the cases (as in the non-systemic docket) deal most often with
harassment and discharge. Next most frequent, but far less common, are claims alleging failure
to hire of discriminatory working conditions, pay or promotion.
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With this brief summary as context, we turn now to a systematic analysis of these cases.
By considering the frequency with which particular injunctive terms were obtained, we examine
how various theories of structural reform measure up to the EEOC’s actual practices.
A. Low Intensity Litigation: Undermining the gladiator theory
As discussed above, the gladiator theory imagines structural reform litigation as highstakes battle, involving hard-fought contests over liability, intense judicial involvement and a
need for ongoing monitoring of compliance with remedial terms of a decree. Examining the
EEOC’s systemic cases, we see little evidence to support these expectations. Tables 2 and 3
profile the EEOC’s systemic docket, by year, in terms of the number of persons compensated
and the monetary awards obtained.
Table 2: Persons Compensated,*
EEOC Systemic Cases Filed FY 1997- 2006
Filing
year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
All years

N
15
12
14
26
24
26
34
31
22
16
220

Mean
41
47
9
34
13
24
26
7
219
18
45

Median
21
56
7
5
8
9
6
4
3
2
7

90 %ile
127
96
23
56
30
52
67
17
29
138
56

Max
163
96
23
330
33
224
216
18
3413
138
3413

Total
410
233
71
475
226
440
645
115
3502
163
6280

* Among cases with any persons compensated
Table 3: Monetary award,* EEOC Systemic Cases Filed FY 1997- 2006.
Real (2007) dollars, in thousands
Filing
year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
All years

N
12
11
12
22
24
26
33
31
22
16
209

Mean
Median
90 %ile Max
$1,425
$870
$3,235
$7,631
$1,816
$728
$2,996 $11,525
$1,959
$280
$7,960 $11,266
$2,519
$285
$2,103 $54,158
$3,855
$622
$6,112 $59,260
$1,092
$366
$3,549
$4,113
$815
$425
$2,254
$2,800
$789
$521
$1,500
$6,178
$4,463
$219 $10,845 $50,153
$275
$113
$800
$1,800
$1,871
$386
$2,808 $59,260

Average
Total, by recovery/
year
person
$21,370
$52
$21,787
$94
$27,420
$386
$65,487
$138
$92,515
$409
$28,401
$65
$27,699
$43
$24,449
$213
$98,186
$28
$4,406
$27
$411,720
$66
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* Among cases with any damages awarded
Whether viewed in terms of the number of people benefitted or by the amount of money
changing hands, the EEOC’s systemic cases are moderate in size. Total damages are not tiny,
but neither are these bet-the-company cases. And while these cases are clearly about more than
individual grievances, they do not generally appear to entail thorough-going reform of largescale institutions—at least as measured by the number of employees benefitted.
Nor do the EEOC’s systemic cases appear to routinely involve hard-fought contests over
liability. Rather, the vast majority of its systemic cases—88% of the resolved cases—ended by
settlement. 169 A mere handful—8% of resolved cases—ended through some sort of litigated
judgment. 170 More details about the types of case resolutions are in Table 4:
Table 4: Type of Resolution, Systemic EEOC cases
filed FY 1997 to 2006*
N
%
1. Settlement
229 87%
2. Withdrawal by EEOC
3
1%
3. Default judgment
9
3%
4. Litigated Judgment for Def’t
8
3%
5. Litigated Judgment for EEOC
13
5%
Total
262
* Among cases resolved by April 22, 2008, the date on
which the data-gathering for this project ended. Nineteen
of the 281 cases in the sample were ongoing as of that date.

Of course a case can be the site of very intensive litigation and nonetheless end by
settlement. That is hardly ever the case in this docket, however. Most of the EEOC’s systemic
cases show little evidence of any rigorous contestation of liability. One hundred and sixty-one,
or 70.3% of the systemic cases that settled, were resolved without a single substantive motion
being filed, 171 and forty-three, or 19% of settled cases, were resolved before the defendant even
filed an answer. Discovery motions 172 were somewhat more common than substantive motions,
as seen in Table 5. Even so, more than half the cases resolved without a discovery motion being
filed. Judicial involvement in the typical cases did not appear to be particularly intense either.
As seen in Table 5, the number of discovery and substantive motions actually ruled on by a judge
169

We coded as the resolution in each case the event by which the EEOC’s complaint was completely resolved,
at least initially, at the district court level. That is, if a judgment was entered, we considered that a resolution,
regardless of subsequent appeal, settlement, or failure to comply. In some cases, as when a district court’s judgment
was overturned on appeal, this event turned out not to be the end of the litigation in the district court.
170

Note, however, that for cases that do NOT settle, appeals are common: the EEOC filed notices of appeal in 4
of the 6 cases in the sample in which it lost; defendants filed a notice of appeal in 8 of the 13 cases in which they
lost.
171

By “substantive motions” we mean any motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6),
motions for judgment on the pleadings, motions for summary judgment and motions for judgment as a matter of
law.
172

By “discovery motions” we mean motions about what information was subject to or protected from
disclosure, such as motions to compel and motions for a protective order. We did not count motions relating solely
to such matters as the timing of discovery.
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before the settlement was quite modest across most of the cases. Only a very small handful of
the settled cases appeared to entail the kind of intense, prolonged litigation battle predicted by
the gladiator model. In the vast run of cases, resolution might have been preceded by a
scheduling conference or two, and less commonly, a judicial ruling on a discovery motion or
two.
Table 5: Significant Motions and Events in EEOC Systemic Cases
Resolved by Agreement (filed FY 1997 to 2005) (N = 229)
Mean Median 75 %ile 90 %ile Max
1. Discovery Motions Filed
2.28
0
2
6
129
2. Discovery Motions Resolved
1.81
0
1
5
110
3. Substantive Motions Filed
0.86
0
1
2
26
4. Substantive Motions Resolved
0.42
0
0
1
21
5. Scheduling/Status Conference Held
1.90
1
2
5
30

Other measures of litigation intensity, reported in Table 6, similarly suggest that the bulk
of the systemic cases entailed low-intensity litigation:
Table 6: Features of EEOC Systemic Cases, FY 1997-2005
1. Days to first resolution
2. Decree pages
3. Length of decree (months)

N
262
215
215

Mean
562
16
30

25th %ile
300
9
24

Median
507
13
30

75th %ile
806
19
36

90 %ile
1051
30
48

Max
2378
75
72

The first row of Table 6 sets out the length of the pre-resolution litigation, which is often
very modest. In fact, in about 6% of the systemic cases, resolution is reached in the first month
after filing, often with joint resolutions proposed for court approval simultaneously with the
court complaint. In such a situation, the court serves as a recorder and potential enforcer of the
settlement, rather than a forum for dispute resolution. More typically, the litigation lasted
between 1 and 3 years. The dockets do not show particularly intense conflict during that time,
however, as Table 6 shows—an average of three motions (two discovery and one substantive).
In any event, resolution having been reached, the decrees that result are not the
behemoths predicted by the gladiator theory. Rather, as Table 6’s row 3 sets out, they tend to be
fairly short—16 pages is the mean, and 75% have fewer than 20 pages. And their length of time
is also quite short. The vast majority of them impose remedial terms for a defined period of
time—a term of months specified at the outset of the decree stage. And as row 3 shows, that
term averages 30 months, and is only rarely as much as 48 months.
What about Owen Fiss’s suggestion (made, admittedly, in an earlier era of litigation) that
the cases do not end with entry of a judgment? In all sorts of institutional reform litigation,
experience teaches that the most crucial work may take place after the decree is entered. 173 As

173

IN

See, e.g., M. KAY HARRIS & DUDLEY P. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES
CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS (1976); PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
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Lloyd Anderson wrote in a study of the implementation phase in structural reform cases,
“Approval of the consent decree, then, is just the beginning of a new and crucial phase of the
case, that of implementing the promises in the decree.” 174 Even when a time limit is specified in
a civil rights injunctive case, such a limit might be extended if the defendant has not complied
prior to the scheduled end date. 175 Among the EEOC’s resolved systemic cases, however, only a
handful define the decree’s duration in substantive terms—and often these provide for early
termination if particular events occur (e.g., if ownership of the company is transferred, 176 or a
facility is closed 177). In just two of the decrees does termination depend on the defendant
achieving some measure of reform. 178 Nor do the docket sheets show evidence of massive
implementation struggles. Only in three or four of the cases do the docket sheets show any sign
of post-decretal injunction-related activity. 179 Thus signs of post-decree implementation struggle
are nearly non-existent. Of course much implementation work may be done without any record
JUDGES AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS (1988); Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in
Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725 (1986).
174

Id. at 727. See also Selmi, supra note 18, at 1330 (“when employment discrimination cases were treated as
involving public rather than purely private interests . . . the filing of the settlement agreement often marked the
beginning of the proceedings rather than the end, as these attorneys carefully reviewed the defendants’ progress to
ensure that the terms of the agreement were being fulfilled”).
175

The EEOC’s decrees very often include a term that allows for extension on the defendant’s demonstrated
noncompliance. See, e.g., Consent Decree, EEOC v. Pinnacle Nissan (CIV 00-1872-PHX-MHM, Feb. 20, 2003),
available at http://chadmin.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/EE-AZ-0085-0004.pdf. But even in the absence of
such a term a defendants’ substantial noncompliance can be grounds for alteration of the decree’s termination date.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Milgard Mfg. Inc., No. 01-MK-1731 (OES) (D. Colo., filed August 31, 2001); for documents and
information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8450 (documenting several extensions to the decree).
176

EEOC v. Sbarros Italian Eatery, 2:00-cv-00774-DB (D. Utah, filed Sept. 29, 2000); for documents and
information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9187.
177

See, e.g., EEOC v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., No. 1:03-cv-01663-ZLW-PAC (D. Colo., filed Aug. 29,
2003); for documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8387.
178

See Consent Decree at 8-9, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 3:04-cv-04731-SI (N.D. Cal.,
Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-CA-0006-0023.pdf; for additional
documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=7903; Consent Decree at 11, EEOC v.
Eagle Financial, Inc., No. 8:97-cv-03274-AW (D. Md., Apr. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-MD-0030-0001.pdf; (“This Consent Decree shall continue in effect
… until the earlier of A. Two years from the entry of this Decree; or B. Until the number of African-American
individuals employed by Eagle at any given moment is within one standard deviation, at a confidence level of 95%,
of the number of African-American individuals expected to be employed based on the most recent decennial census
data available for the job category of Teller, plus an additional twelve months; so long as that at the expiration of the
additional 12 months the number of African-American individuals employed by Eagle remains within two standard
deviations.”). For additional documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=7903.
179

In Milfard Mfg. Inc., supra note 175, there were four decree extensions, from three to five years, because of
compliance issues. In EEOC v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., No. 3:99-CV-50362 (N.D. Ill, filed Nov. 3, 1999) (for
documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8978), apparent enforcement struggles
were ended by the defendants’ bankruptcy. In EEOC v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Tex., No. 5:99-CV-01088ECP
(W.D.
Tex.
filed
Sept.
30,
1999)
(for
documents
and
information,
see
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9390) and EEOC v. STI Holdings, Inc., No. 03-C-0543-S (W.D. Wis.,
filed Sept. 30, 2003) (for documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8764) there
were efforts to enforce or extend the decree. Other cases do exhibit non-substantive post-decretal activity, such as
notification to the court about distribution of monetary awards, attorneys’ fees motions, etc.
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making it into a court file, but one would expect major disputes to leave their mark on docket
sheets.
In sum, we find little evidence that the gladiator theory accurately captures the nature of
the EEOC’s systemic litigation during the period of our study. On virtually every relevant
dimension we measured—e.g., type of resolution, intensity of litigation, post-decree activity—
the EEOC’s systemic docket appears to be made up of modest-sized, mostly ordinary cases, not
epic struggles.
B. Limited Problem-Solving: Undermining the Collaboration Theory
Measuring the EEOC’s injunctive practices against the collaboration theory is difficult
because of the theory’s lack of concrete or objective criteria for identifying its core practices. By
definition, the collaborative approach eschews the exemplary case, emphasizing instead
flexibility, experimentalism and context-specific problem-solving. It offers no list of essential
components or key factors to be included in an effective remedy. As Sturm puts it, “the goal is
most decidedly not to develop a one-size-fits all model or a predetermined set of criteria.”180
Nevertheless, several key characteristics would seem to be essential to a collaborative approach
to addressing structural discrimination.
First, a true problem-solving regime will be customized to the particular workplace,181
resulting in a wide variety of injunctive relief provisions across cases, with the specifics in each
case tailored to the unique circumstances of that particular employer. Second, effective remedies
will be “functionally integrated” 182—that is, they will link the processes for pursuing antidiscrimination goals with the employer’s core productive and personnel activities. The third and
fourth characteristics important to a second-generation structural response are data-driven
decision-making and accountability. 183 These two characteristics are closely related, because
often it is the generation of data that makes it possible to measure effectiveness and hold
decision-makers accountable. We compare our observations of the EEOC’s injunctive practices
to each of these characteristics in turn. In order to do so, we examine the actual terms of the
injunctive remedies obtained by the EEOC, whether through settlement or contested court order.
Full documentation of the injunctive relief was not available in all cases, and default cases tend
to involve defunct defendants, and are therefore omitted, so the discussion here rests on an
analysis of 215 systemic cases.
Contextual remedies.
The experimentalist regulation literature, of which the
collaboration theory is an example, is skeptical of rigid, rule-based remedies, arguing instead for
a more flexible, contextual approach that accounts for the “complexity and diversity of
organizational forms.” 184 Traditional rule-enforcement remedies narrowly define compliance “as
the absence of identifiable conduct violating those rules” and fail to recognize how “intra180

Sturm, supra note 14, at 492.

181

Id. at 519.

182

Id.

183

Id. at 519-20.

184

Id. at 492.
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organizational culture and decision processes” can “entrench bias, stereotyping, and unequal
access.” 185 The collaboration theory sees the solution to second-generation discrimination in
contextually-based remedies in which firms are incentivized to “problem-solve” by “address[ing]
their particular culture, power dynamics, and patterns of daily interaction.” 186
Examining the injunctive remedies obtained by the EEOC in its systemic cases suggests a
continuing reliance on traditional rule-enforcement remedies. As Table 7 indicates, the most
commonly obtained injunctive provision is the simple “thou shalt not” command—an order
prohibiting the defendant from engaging in unlawful discrimination (row 1a, 88%). Only
slightly less common is an order prohibiting retaliation against employees who complain about
unlawful discrimination (row 1b, 80%). These orders take the classic form of the ruleenforcement remedy as a rigid and externally defined prohibition.
Table 7: Types of Remedies in EEOC Systemic Cases
(N=215)
Type of remedy
1. Rule Enforcement Remedies
a. D prohibited from discriminating
b. D prohibited from retaliating
c. Other requirements
2. Peripheral Remedies
a. Require EEO training
b. Post notice of equal employment rights
c. Distribute notice of equal employment rights
d. Develop/modify anti-discrimination policy
e. Implement complaint/dispute resolution process
3. Functionally Integrated Remedies
a. Advertising/recruitment requirements
b. Require objective hiring/promotion criteria
c. Require recruitment, hiring or promotion
protocols
d. Quantitative goals specified
e. Require objective job descriptions

N

%

189
174
30

88%
81%
14%

188
184
105
72
68

87%
86%
49%
33%
32%

34
30

16%
14%

30

14%

20
12

9%
6%

A significant minority of the cases imposed other types of rule-enforcement requirements
on employers (row 1c, 14%). However, although some were context-specific, they generally
185

Id. at 475, 467-68. See also Green, supra note 14, at 145 (seeking to hold employers responsible for
“organizational choices, institutional practices, and workplace dynamics that enable the operation of discriminatory
bias”).
186

Sturm, supra note 14, at 519. See also Green, supra note 14, at 144 (arguing that the “complex, contextual
nature” of structural employment discrimination requires an “innovative, problem-based, collaborative solution” that
does not fit with traditional remedies).
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were not the type of flexible, problem-solving remedy called for by the collaboration theory. In
many cases, the orders are merely specific applications of general anti-discrimination
principles—for example, an order that forbids harassment of African-American employees. 187
Others respond to the unique facts of a case, such as orders requiring that certain named
individuals be fired, or not be re-hired, 188 or, in one case, an order prohibiting a firm from
sponsoring company events at “adult entertainment establishments.” 189 In another case, the
injunctive remedy required the defendant employer, a private school, to offer tuition waivers for
the complainants’ enrolled children. 190 Such a remedy, while certainly creative and contextspecific, does not seek to address structural sources of second-generation discrimination.
Functionally Integrated Remedies. If a collaborative approach is taken to addressing
second-generation discrimination, one would expect to see injunctive terms that affect the core
decision-processes of the firm. Thus, rather than seeking to eliminate a discrete, identifiable
discriminatory practice, such an approach will link these normative concerns to the firm’s core
business or personnel practices in order to reform those structures and processes which allow
bias to operate. 191 An example of a functionally integrated remedy is a requirement that the
employer change its methods of evaluating and selecting employees for promotion to avoid
processes that systematically disadvantage women or underrepresented minorities. 192 By
contrast, “peripheral remedies” do not require any changes in how the employer carries on its
usual business operations—for example, requiring its employees to undergo EEO training.
As seen in Table 7, functionally integrated remedies were far less commonly deployed in
the EEOC’s systemic cases than were peripheral remedies. Aside from the traditional “thou shalt
not” injunctions discussed above, the most common remedies ordered were a requirement that
the employer provide EEO training to its employees (row 2a, 87%) and that it post a notice
informing employees of their rights under equal employment laws (row 2b, 85%). Far less
common—though important, as we argue below—were remedies trenching on a firm’s existing
personnel practices, such as a requirement that objective criteria be used for hiring and
promotion (row 3.b, 13%), or that job openings be publicized in ways designed to reach all
potentially qualified applicants (row 3.a, 15%).
One might argue that a simple count is misleading, however, because not all of the
functionally integrated remedies are appropriate in all cases. For example, requiring objective
promotion criteria might be warranted in a case alleging a discriminatory failure to promote, but
187

EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 2:00-cv-02762-WMA, N.D. Ala., filed
Sept. 28, 2000); for documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9454
188

See, e.g., EEOC v. Lockheed Martin, 2007 WL 4468658 (D. Haw. 2007) (No. 1:05-cv-00479-SPK-LEK,
filed Aug. 1, 2005); for documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=6096; EEOC v.
Midamerica Hotels Corp., 2004 WL 758054 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (No. 4:03-CV-00107 HEA, filed Jan. 30, 2003); for
documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8411.
189

EEOC v. Custom Companies, Inc., 2007 WL 1810495 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (No. 1:02-cv-03768, filed May 28,
2002); for documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=7999.
190

EEOC v. Univ. of the Incarnate World, No. 5:99-cv-01090-OLG (W.D. Tex., filed Sept. 30, 1999); for
documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8413.
191

Green, supra note 14, at 148.

192

Id. at 148, 155.
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not in a case involving only charges of sexual harassment. However, the very idea of structural
reform is premised on the theory that discriminatory outcomes are not isolated, one-off incidents,
but occur because the overarching structure of work permits bias to operate in an organization. 193
Thus, sexual harassment should not be viewed as the result of one bad actor, but a system in
which women workers are isolated tokens, or alternatively, lack power within the
organization. 194 To the extent that the remedies obtained by the EEOC are narrowly tailored to
address only the specific legal issues alleged, they are inconsistent with a structural approach to
addressing second generation forms of discrimination. 195
In addition to coding for the most commonly occurring forms of injunctive relief
obtained by the EEOC, we also captured information about other “miscellaneous” types of relief.
Review of these additional provisions revealed little in the way of functionally integrated
remedies. Most simply entailed more detailed instructions regarding how the standard set of
remedies should be carried out. For example, one decree required that the posted notice of
employees’ rights should state where the closest EEOC office is located and explain that
complaints could be filed there. 196 Another required the employer to provide the EEO notices on
employees’ paychecks, along with contact information for reporting violations. 197
The one notable exception is a group of cases—fewer than 20—that included provisions
requiring the employer to integrate consideration of managers’ compliance efforts in their
performance evaluations. Typical of these provisions were requirements that a defendant “revise
its performance evaluation forms for managers and supervisors in order to include measures for
performance compliance with [its] discrimination, harassment and retaliation policies and
procedures,” 198 or impose substantial discipline “upon any supervisor or manager who engages
in sex discrimination or permits any such conduct to occur.” 199 In cases in which quantitative
goals were specified, however, achievement of or progress towards those quantitative goals was
not required to be part of managers’ performance evaluations. Thus, even when injunctive terms
attempted to incorporate anti-discrimination goals into the job responsibilities of critical
decision-makers in the workplace, those goals were usually broadly and negatively defined. We
see little evidence in our sample of any affirmative obligations imposed on key decision-makers
to engage in the sort of accountable problem-solving called for by the collaboration theories.
193

Id. at 149.

194

See Sturm, supra note 14, at 477.

195

This point is emphasized by ARIANE HEGEWISCH, CYNTHIA DEITCH, & EVELYN MURPHY, ENDING SEX AND
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: LEGAL INTERVENTIONS THAT PUSH THE ENVELOPE (March 2011),
available at http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/ending-sex-and-race-discrimination-in-theworkplace-legalinterventions-that-push-the-envelope-1.
196

EEOC v. Arrowhead Bagel Company, 2:00-cv-01860-SMM (D. Ariz., filed Sept. 28, 2000) ; for documents
and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9000.
197

Midamerica Hotels Corp., supra note 188.

198

Consent Decree at 8, EEOC v. Valentino Las Vegas, LLC, No. 2:04-cv-01357-JCM-LRL (D. Nev., Oct. 12,
2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/EE-NV-0042-0002.pdf; for additional
documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8747.
199

Consent Decree at 8-9, EEOC v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-00503-RSL (W.D. Wash., June 1,
2004), available at http://chadmin.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/EE-WA-0098-0002.pdf; for additional
documents and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8962.
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Generate relevant data. Under a second-generation structural approach, one would
expect to see employers required to generate and share relevant data about such matters as the
gender and racial composition of hiring pools and different job classifications, the effects of
different personnel practices, and the incidence of complaints by employees. 200 Such data is
necessary not only to identify problems and encourage problem-solving; they also make it
possible to hold firms accountable for the organizational structures and decision-making
processes they put into place.
In a substantial proportion of the cases in our sample, the injunctive remedies included
provisions generating data about the firm’s operations. As seen in Table 8, most commonly
included was a provision the required a defendant to report on its compliance with the injunctive
terms. Because many of the provisions involved peripheral remedies like posting a notice of
rights or conducting training, some of this compliance reporting had little to do with a firm’s
core operations. However, in a majority of cases (row 2, 55%), some sort of record-keeping,
often more directly tied to business operations or personnel practices, was required—for
example, maintaining records of complaints, the race of applicants, or the outcomes of promotion
decisions. Also included in a majority of cases (row 3, 55%) was a requirement that employers
report complaints received about discrimination or harassment. Less common were provisions
of specific forms of audit or regular reports on whether quantitative goals were achieved.
Table 8: Remedies Involving Data Generation in EEOC Systemic Cases
(N=215)
%
Type of remedy
N
1. Compliance reporting
180
84%
2. Record-keeping
121
56%
3. Reports on complaints/incidents
118
55%
4. Auditing
15
7%
5. Subset: Quantitative Goals Specified
20
9%
a. Outcomes required to be reported
10
50%
b. Outcomes assessed against goals
5
25%
In a significant proportion of cases, then, the injunctive relief included requirements that
a firm generate data about its practices, although the type of data most often produced was
information about complaints and reported incidents of discrimination or harassment. To that
extent, the data generated lends itself more readily to detecting and addressing potential rule
violations rather than to diagnosing structural conditions that enable bias to or to engaging in
proactive problem-solving.
Accountability. As mentioned above, generating data is closely linked to accountability.
According to the collaborative theory, accountability is necessary to assure that a firm deals with
the problems identified through the information generating process.
Focusing on accountability also raises the question of accountability to whom? Sturm is
reluctant to hold firms accountable to courts, for fear of “reproducing the limitations of a rule-

200

Sturm, supra note 14, at 519-20; Green, supra note 14, at 155.
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enforcing dynamic.” 201 On the other hand, leaving employers accountable only to themselves
“risks abdicating accommodation to public norms.” 202 As a solution, she suggests that effective
structural reform efforts must include a crucial role for intermediaries—individuals and
nongovernmental organizations who can “translat[e] and mediat[e] between formal law and
workplace practice.” 203 These intermediaries are involved in evaluating and revising a firm’s
practices on an ongoing basis, at the same time that they are connected to a “broader community
of practice,” which enables them to identify problems and promote best practices. Similarly, in
assessing the efficacy of labor standards, Estlund also emphasizes the role of intermediaries. She
argues that the critical elements of an effective system of workplace self-regulation are
“independent outside monitoring and some form of effective employee participation.” 204
Although her concern is primarily with enforcement of labor standards, Estlund similarly argues
that any successful project of self-regulation requires the involvement of employees.
Finding evidence of “systems of accountability” imposed by the injunctive terms in our
sample is difficult. The characteristics most closely capturing accountability are whether
quantitative goals are specified and whether the duration of a consent decree is measured not in
months, but in terms of the achievement of substantive goals. As seen in Table 9, relatively few
cases incorporated terms of these sorts (9% and 4% respectively, in rows 2 and 1). The other
types of compliance measures identified (11%, row 3) mostly involved setting time deadlines for
performing acts required under the decree, such as making payment to individual complainants,
giving notice of the action, posting a notice of rights or conducting training sessions. Thus, they
set out measures of accountability for performing specific acts required by the injunction, rather
than accountability for the ways in which the firms’ structures or processes might enable
discriminatory bias to operate.
Table 9: Remedies Involving Accountability Measures in EEOC Systemic Cases
(N=215)
Type of remedy
N
%
1. Duration of decree specified in non-time terms
10
5%
2. Quantitative goals and timetables specified
20
9%
3. Other measures of compliance specified
22
10%

201

Sturm, supra note 14, at 521

202

Id. at 523.

203

Id.

204

Estlund, supra note 58, at 325.
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Table 10: Remedies Involving Accountability to Stakeholders
and Intermediaries in EEOC Systemic Cases (N=222)
Any Complaint Compliance Monitoring Other
Role / Incident Reports
Reports
205
115
178
123
53
1. Any stakeholder access
2. Internal Reporting
a. Internal Manager
33
1
2
3
27
b. Peer Worker Group
1
0
0
0
1
c. Union
0
0
0
0
0
3. External Reporting
a. EEOC
201
113
178
108
3
b. Private Plaintiff or
7
3
6
1
0
Counsel
c. Consultant
26
2
4
12
18
d. Monitor/Special Master
9
2
1
3
8
e. Advocacy Group
1
0
1
0
0
Any successful system of accountability not only requires the production of information,
but must empower individuals or entities to receive and respond to that information. Examining
the decrees in our sample reveals modest efforts to empower external intermediaries. In roughly
18% of the cases, appointed monitors or outside consultants who specialize in EEO matters are
given some role in implementing the remedial terms. In a similar proportion of the cases, an
internal manager at the firm was given some responsibility or authority regarding decree
implementation.
What is notably absent, however, is any attempt to empower workers, either through a
union or a more informally created group. In only one case out of 224 did we see any effort to
involve workers in the problem-solving 205 and in none was any role created for a union in
monitoring the terms of a consent decree or participating in restructuring processes within the
firm. Unfortunately, we lack information about base rates—we do not know in how many cases
a union was present at the workplace that might have been called on to ensure accountability.
And the labor laws’ hostility to employer-created worker organizations 206 might well have
discouraged other efforts to involve employees in problem-solving. Still, the nearly complete

205

EEOC v. Rainbow Rest. Props., Inc., 0:06-cv-00988-PJS-JJG (D. Minn., filed Mar. 7, 2006); for documents
and information, see http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8368; the case involved allegations of
discriminatory harassment against Hispanic and Latino workers by the employer, a restaurant. Among other things,
the consent decree called for the creation of an employee advisory committee, composed of at least one-half
Hispanic or Latino employees “to review and present feedback to Chino Latino regarding its marketing and
advertising efforts.” The consent decree does not make clear whether the “marketing and advertising efforts”
referred to are in regards to hiring and promotion or the restaurant’s services, nor does it provide any other details
regarding the role or composition of the employee advisory committee.
206

Estlund, supra note 58, at 362-63. See also sources cited id. at n.199.
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lack of any provisions calling for accountability to line-employees, the ultimate stakeholders in
cases involving discrimination and harassment, seems inconsistent with collaborative theories. 207
Although neither outsiders nor stakeholders within the defendant firms are consistently
given monitoring or enforcement powers, the decrees do—overwhelmingly—create some ongoing role for the EEOC. In nearly all—201 out of 215—the defendant is obligated to report to
the EEOC or submit to monitoring by it. Thus, of all the potential monitors and stakeholders, the
EEOC is the principal entity empowered with information and rights of access that might be
leveraged to hold firms accountable for engaging in meaningful problem-solving.
The decrees alone do not tell us if or how the EEOC exercise the powers it thus acquires
through its consent decrees, but the agency appears to have the capacity to engage in meaningful
monitoring. Our data suggest that there are about 70 systemic decrees open at any given time;
that amounts to fewer than two dozen reports per month, spread out among all the EEOC’s
attorneys. However, neither our case studies nor the systemic docket as a whole shows evidence
of vigorous monitoring activity by the EEOC. Recall that in Dial and McKesson, where the
EEOC’s attorneys felt there was a need for close monitoring, they negotiated the hiring of
outside consultants to oversee implementation. In the more typical cases like PJAX, reports to
the EEOC are required, but the case documents and dockets do not indicate any post-decretal
activity. While it is possible EEOC lawyers spent time analyzing and following up on these
reports, our interviews suggest that post-decree monitoring was not a priority for the agency. 208
In addition, perhaps we see little evidence of on-going monitoring because the most common
remedies—such as posting notices and conducting training—are easy for firms to comply with
and compliance is readily verifiable.
As in the case of the gladiator theory, then, we find little evidence in our study period of a
new collaborative model for addressing structural reform. In the EEOC’s systemic cases, the
injunctive relief primarily emphasized traditional rule-based prohibitions or peripheral remedies
such as EEO training, rather than empowering stakeholders to engage in collaborative problemsolving.
C. Enforced Managerialism
If neither the gladiator nor the collaboration theory accurately describes the EEOC’s
systemic cases, how are they best understood? Our study suggests that the EEOC’s injunctive
practices in these cases are part of a larger phenomenon, namely, the widespread adoption of
routinized bureaucratic responses to the legal prohibition on employment discrimination. As
discussed in Part I.C., supra, a rich sociological literature has explored how firms have
constructed civil rights law, infusing it with managerial values as they internalized its
commands. The result has been the development and diffusion of a number of standard
responses, adopted by firms to signal compliance and reduce liability risks. 209 Although the
sociological literature focuses on firms’ voluntary responses to general legal mandates, rather
207

Cf. Estlund, supra note 58, at 333 (arguing that the regulatory model renders employees the passive
beneficiaries of the government’s protection).
208

See, e.g., text accompanying note 150, supra; text accompanying notes 122 to 127.

209

See, e.g., Edelman, Legal Ambiguity, supra note 64; DOBBIN, INVENTING EO, supra note 31.
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than particularized litigation, our study suggests that the EEOC has played a role through its
systemic injunctive litigation in ratifying those responses and promoting their adoption.
In our analysis, the injunctive terms obtained in the EEOC’s systemic cases largely
mirror the bureaucratic practices recommended by human resources professionals to comply
with anti-discrimination law in non-injunctive contexts. Several of the most common decree
terms we observed—the prohibition on discrimination and retaliation and the posting
requirements—simply reassert the anti-discrimination mandate and provide notice of those rules
to workers (although they also substantially ease the path of further enforcement, if further
enforcement is needed). However, the other common terms, such as requiring EEO training,
developing an anti-discrimination policy and implementing a complaint or grievance process, are
precisely the types of responses developed and spread by human resources professionals. 210
Even the less commonly imposed remedies in our study, such as requiring the posting of
available positions or the development of objective hiring or promotion criteria, are bureaucratic
measures widely accepted as constituting human resources “best practices.” 211
The terms of the EEOC’s systemic cases are thus similar to those criticized by Selmi as
demonstrating limited ambition to change employer practices or remedy past discrimination.
Selmi’s theory is that more meaningful structural reform has fallen by the wayside as profitmotivated private attorneys, focusing on monetary damages, have been willing to settle for
anemic forms of injunctive relief. 212 EEOC lawyers, however, are unlikely to be driven to the
same extent by pocketbook incentives, given that their pay and other work benefits are not
contingent on the amount of money damages recovered. 213 (Other incentives may, of course,
encourage EEOC employees to seek high damages, 214 but they are likely softer than in the
private sector.) Moreover, as discussed in Part II, supra, the EEOC professes to prioritize
systemic cases, seeing itself as “uniquely positioned” to focus on injunctive, rather than
monetary, relief. 215 If the EEOC is less likely distracted by financial incentives, what then
explains its embrace of managerialist remedies?
It is worth noting that in some ways, what we observe is nothing new. In the 1970s when
it was first authorized to sue employers, the EEOC pursued consent agreements with a number of
large employers that required them to adopt “best practices” recommended by personnel experts
210
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at the time. 216 For example, a consent decree with AT&T required revised salary classifications
and the use of validated job tests, while other companies agreed to change their seniority systems
and to actively recruit women and minorities—all practices endorsed by personnel experts at the
time. 217 Thus, the EEOC’s emphasis on widely accepted human resources practices, which we
observe in a more recent period, is continuous in some ways with its past injunctive efforts.
Yet if the turn to human resources practices is nothing new, the particulars of the
injunctive remedies obtained by the EEOC during our study period differ from those it sought in
the 1970s; remedies during the more recent period are far more limited. The reasons, we
suspect, are to be found both in and out of the courts. The more aggressive remedies of an
earlier era—requiring job tests to be validated, restructuring job ladders, and the like—followed
Supreme Court decisions such as Griggs v. Duke Power Company 218 and Albemarle Paper 219
that defined discrimination expansively. These decisions suggested that anti-discrimination
statutes barred more than animus, and that many previously accepted employer practices could
constitute actionable discrimination. The Court has, in more recent years, been far more skeptical
of this kind of reasoning, necessarily reducing the ability of plaintiffs’ lawyers to obtain
expansive remedies through litigation, including by negotiation. Moreover, especially after the
Supreme Court in Faragher and Ellerth ratified anti-harassment policies and grievance
procedures as harassment prevention tools, it makes sense that both personnel experts and legal
actors increasingly promoted these less intrusive procedures as a means of legal compliance.
Outside the courts, as Dobbin, Edelman, and others have documented, organizational responses
to Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws likewise shifted, as professionals promoted new
practices and in turn influenced doctrinal developments 220
As times and the law have changed, it is unsurprising that the EEOC has continued to
look to human resources “best practices” when shaping its decrees, because both the agency and
personnel professionals were responding to the same challenges. The mandate of the law is
clear—do not discriminate—but Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes offer no concrete
guidance as to what constitutes compliance. 221 In the face of legal ambiguity, firms are
motivated to adopt structures or practices that visibly signal compliance with the law. 222 As
Dobbin and Kalev explain about the widespread acceptance of anti-harassment training
programs, the personnel profession “had a plausible compliance remedy that offered executives a
formalized solution, and judges a bright-line standard by which they could assess employers.” 223
216
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And once the Court signaled its acceptance of these structures as a sign of compliance, 224
companies had all the more reason to adopt them. As one employer-side lawyer explained, “The
beauty of these rulings is that companies now know what they have to do: They have to advertise
a no-harassment policy, run training programs and have a discipline-response mechanism. If the
company does those things, they can defend against these cases.” 225 Similarly, when pursuing
systemic cases, the EEOC needed concrete remedies it could impose that would manifest firms’
compliance with the law. The “best practices” adopted by leading organizations and promoted
by personnel professionals offered a solution—plausible forms of compliance that are visible and
readily verifiable.
An additional plausible reason the EEOC has repeatedly drawn on bureaucratic solutions
to enforcement problems is that the Commission is itself a large bureaucratic organization.
Managerialist remedies may appear familiar to its lawyers from the EEOC’s own employment
practices, and in any event such remedies meet the agency’s need to rationalize and standardize
its core function of enforcing anti-discrimination norms in the workplace. The EEOC must
coordinate the work of scores of attorneys across the country to advance a common goal, and it
utilizes several levers to direct their activities. For example, it distributes a Compliance Manual
with sample decrees, and draft decrees are reviewed at the regional level and, for decrees with
over 20 benefitted parties, at the national level as well. As a result, as EEOC regional attorney
John Hendrickson says, “The consent decrees look awfully cookie cutter, and they are.” 226
V.

Conclusion: Assessing the EEOC’s Systemic Efforts

This Article’s project is positive, not normative. Nevertheless, we briefly consider in
conclusion how our examination of the nature of the EEOC’s injunctive practice bears on various
normative claims in the literature:
Our study of the EEOC’s systemic cases suggests that the consent decrees it obtains
primarily implement managerialist remedies—the policies and structures considered “best
practices” by many firms and human resources professionals. If this depiction is accurate, is it a
problem? A number of scholars have been highly critical of the legal profession’s embrace of
managerialist responses, and their criticism would likely extend to the EEOC practices we
document as well. Bagenstos, for example, concludes that “there is scant evidence that the
responses urged [by lawyers and consultants] actually result in equal treatment or unbiased
decisionmaking.” 227 Similarly, Selmi describes these types of remedies as “cosmetic in nature”
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and “primarily designed to address public relations problems,” 228 while Bisom-Rapp dismisses
training programs as “symbolic gestures” whose efficacy has little empirical support. 229
Scholars are correct to point out that, for many standard managerialist remedies, there is a
disturbing lack of empirical evidence of their effectiveness in redressing or preventing
discrimination. 230 In particular, the heavy emphasis on EEO and sexual harassment training in
the courts and by the legal profession is troubling. Studies do not support the claim that these
programs can change employee attitudes; indeed, evidence suggests that if poorly conducted,
they can produce backlash harmful to women and minority employees. 231 In light of these
concerns, the frequency with which the EEOC negotiates training as a court-enforceable remedy
raises questions about the effectiveness of its efforts to secure relief for victims of
discrimination.
We agree wholeheartedly that more empirical evidence is needed, rather than assuming
that a practice is effective just because it is widely accepted. But it seems likely that some
managerialist responses are, indeed, useful. 232 In particular, bureaucratic controls may help
constrain decisionmaking in ways that reduce the influence of stereotypes and implicit biases.
For example, sociologists have concluded that “[f]ormalized practices or formal structures such
as a personnel or human resources department reduce the use of sex and race as hiring criteria by
limiting decision makers’ discretion,” whereas “[s]ubjective hiring procedures and vague criteria
free decision makers to favor persons of their own race or sex.” 233 Similarly, Kalev et al. found
evidence that practices that assign organizational responsibility for change—e.g. affirmative
action plans, diversity committees, diversity managers—are effective in increasing the
proportion of women and minorities in management. 234 Thus, any assessment of the EEOC’s
injunctive practices ought to focus on whether a particular managerialist response is actually
helpful or not. The fact that some of the remedies pursued by the EEOC are likely ineffective
does not mean that all bureaucratic responses are problematic.
In addition, even if other settlement terms might be more effective in any given case,
evaluating the EEOC’s approach needs to consider the Commission’s docket as a whole, not case
by case. Perhaps the EEOC would have been more effective at promoting equal employment
opportunity in a particular case it if pursued a more muscular kind of litigation—with more
aggressive claims for higher damages, more intrusive remedies, longer enforcement periods, and
more onerous decree termination provisions. But it is important to remember that the EEOC
operates under constraints. Gladiator litigation requires lots of time and effort, and true
228
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collaboration is also highly resource intensive. A relatively easy-to-apply, bureaucratic approach
to injunctive remedies allows the agency to bring—and resolve—more lawsuits.
Sociologists have noted that the process of “managerialization of law” is an ambiguous
one. One the one hand, it “has the potential to undermine legal ideals.” 235 Grievance processes,
for example, “tend to recast grievances in ways that downplay legal issues and that focus instead
on more typically managerial concerns . . .; disputes that originate as rights violations . . . are
likely to be handled as interpersonal difficulties, administrative problems, or psychological
pathologies.” 236 On the other hand, as the law is reframed “in ways that make it appear more
consistent with traditional managerial prerogatives,” they are more easily internalized by
organizations. 237 When the personnel profession recasts civil rights imperatives as initiatives
that are good for business, that promotes the internalization of these legal norms, albeit in an
altered form. Similarly, it may be rational for the EEOC to pursue familiar bureaucratic
practices in the Commission’s consent decrees. The EEOC’s systemic cases we examined were
overwhelmingly settlements, and the agency needed some level of employer buy-in to resolve
them short of full-blown litigation. The EEOC’s ability to resolve cases may be enhanced when
it pursues remedies that have the aura of being good for business. For the employer faced with
ongoing litigation, it must be easier to accept a settlement that entails the adoption of practices
already followed in many leading organizations.
Moreover, the EEOC’s practices can have impact even beyond its docket, by influencing
employer practice. If the remedies the EEOC pursues suggest “best practices,” employers
seeking to avoid lawsuits can emulate those practices long before they face any concrete threat of
suit. In this way, bureaucratic solutions to civil rights problems may magnify the EEOC’s
influence by providing employers with a road map for compliance. If more onerous terms were
demanded, employers might opt not to comply until forced through litigation. On net, whether
the agency would be more effective by forcing more radical change on fewer employers than by
litigating—and settling—more cases on standardized terms depends on the effectiveness of the
standard remedies.
Finally, the EEOC operates under political and legal constraints. Congress establishes
the Commission’s budget and exercises oversight authority. If the agency pursues a reform
agenda more aggressive than that preferred by key political leaders, it risks being reined in by
Congress. According to former EEOC Commissioner Paul Steven Miller, “Congress . . . sees us
as an agency which is there to manage employment discrimination disputes,” 238 rather than to
prevent or remedy discrimination. If, in fact, Congress has such a limited view of the
Commission’s role, a strategy of settling many cases on standardized terms rather than
vigorously pursuing a handful of transformative cases may make sense. Legal doctrine also
cabins the EEOC’s ability to pursue structural reform. If the injunctive relief it pursues is less
robust than it could be, the problem may stem as much, or more, from the courts’ evolving
doctrine as from a lack of commitment on the part of the EEOC. As Bagenstos has pointed out,
235
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claims about what types of employer conduct are wrongful and should be prevented are deeply
controversial. 239 Judges have been increasingly reluctant to embrace a more expansive definition
of discrimination—one that holds employers accountable for structural disadvantage and not
merely intentional forms of invidious discrimination. 240 And as the courts’ conception of what
constitutes discrimination has contracted, so, too, has the remedial ambition of structural reform
cases. Consent decrees, after all, are negotiated settlements reached in the shadow of the law.
As a result, the EEOC’s ability to pursue more aggressive structural remedies has diminished.
Whether or not the EEOC’s injunctive practices we observed in our study period were optimal in
the sense of being maximally effective in combating workplace discrimination, they were an
understandable response to the various constraints under which the agency operated. 241 Indeed,
under a more individualized, fault-based understanding of discrimination, the EEOC might find
it difficult to pursue even rather routine managerialist remedies. 242
In any event, to repeat, our project is positive not normative. This paper has looked at the
EEOC’s litigation but not at what happens at the regulated workplaces. We do not here assess
either the problems the EEOC sought to solve or the Commission’s success or failure in that
endeavor. And the positive point is this: Existing visions of structural reform litigation are
altogether too romantic. The EEOC’s injunctive cases demonstrate neither contests to the death,
nor collaborative love-fests; instead, they provide evidence that the managerialism so evident in
non-litigation responses to EEO imperatives is evident, as well, in the EEOC’s large and
influential component of the civil rights docket.
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